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From the autumn of 2014, a new performance pay scheme was introduced for school teachers in 
England and Wales. It makes pay progression for all teachers dependent upon their performance as 
evaluated by their line managers by means of performance appraisals. This paper reports the results of 
a the first wave of a survey of teachers’ views about performance pay and their beliefs about its 
effects on their performance and that of their schools before the first decisions about pay awards 
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were also surveyed. The results so far confirm a broadly negative view among teachers as to the 
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0. Summary
In the autumn of 2013, a new pay system was introduced for school teachers in England and 
Wales, linking future pay progression to performance. For teachers at an earlier stage in their 
careers, on the Main Scale, this meant that henceforth annual pay progression would be based 
on a performance review against agreed objectives and teachers' standards. For more senior 
teachers, on the Upper Pay Scale, this meant a reinvigoration of a link with performance that 
was judged to have declined since its introduction in 2000. In addition, schools were given 
greater flexibility to manage pay.  
To investigate how the new system is working, and to follow its development over time, 
researchers at the London School of Economics designed a survey to track how teachers' 
motivation and work practices and those of their schools evolve as the new system takes 
shape. This paper presents provisional results from the study's first wave that took place 
between January and April 2014. This timing was designed to coincide with teachers being 
familiar enough with the new scheme to answer questions about it, but before they would 
have received any performance-related payments that might colour their perceptions. Some 
results are also compared with those of an earlier LSE study of the Threshold system of pay 
progression introduced in schools in 2000. 
Overall, teachers remain very sceptical as to the benefits of performance-related pay in 
schools, with less than a quarter agreeing with the principle, and that it will lead to greater 
fairness, or reward good teaching. The great majority are also sceptical that, even if they 
perform well, their schools cannot afford to pay for their performance. Part of this scepticism 
can be attributed to a widely held belief that performance is the result of teamwork in schools, 
and of fears that it will lead to favouritism. Few think it will help retention. Teachers on the 
Upper Pay Scale were distinctly more negative than those on the Main Pay Scale, and early 
career teachers. School leaders are somewhat more positive about performance pay, but many 
voiced concerns about its suitability for schools and possible harm to teamwork.  
A significant factor underlying negative attitudes to performance pay appears to be its 
perceived impact on groups of teachers at specific points on the former pay scales. In 
particular, those at the top of the old Main Scale (M6) experience a very sharp increase in 
negative views of performance pay which may be attributed to changes concerning Threshold 
progression. Among those at the top of the Upper Pay Scale, there is a similar rise in negative 
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views of performance pay which could be due to the lack of scope for further pay progression 
with or without performance pay, and a feeling that they could lose out under the new 
performance rules. 
 
On the other hand, the great majority of teachers recognise that those who do their jobs well 
make a real difference to their students, and that there are significant differences in teaching 
effectiveness among their colleagues. Thus their opposition to the principle is based neither 
on a denial of differences in teaching performance, nor that they matter for their students. The 
question is whether linking pay to performance is the best way to address them. Some of the 
reasons teachers in the survey put forward for this variation could potentially be addressed by 
pay, for example, motivation or morale differences, but others may be more amenable to other 
policies, such as improved professional development. Performance reviews are recognised as 
one means by which such needs can be identified and addressed. 
 
Although performance reviews address formally the themes that are specified in the 
regulations, there is more variation on the qualitative side, in terms of perceptions of how 
supportive they are, and how much influence teachers believe they have over their objectives. 
Among classroom teachers who had acted as appraisers, there was a general view that the 
reviews helped focus on work priorities, and they enabled a discussion of poor performance. 
However, there was less confidence that they address the factors teachers associated with 
differences in effectiveness, with the exception of professional development. Teachers also 
reported that the appraisal system had not really led them to make any radical changes in their 
teaching practice, although several acknowledged small or moderate changes. The exception 
was to focus more on improving student test scores.  
 
Teachers' use of their non-directed time, how they allocate it between different school 
activities, could be seen as an example of where performance priorities can be altered in 
schools. In 2000, with the introduction of Threshold Assessment, teachers who were eligible 
for the assessment appeared to allocate more of their time to lesson preparation. There appears 
to be no equivalent peak in 2014. However, this may be due to uncertainty in the minds of 
many teachers about how the new scheme will operate, and it is possible that the greater 
flexibility of the new system spreads opportunities for progression more evenly across the pay 
spine whereas in 2000 the initial rewards were very much concentrated at the Threshold. 
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Well-conducted performance reviews are associated with more positive (less negative) views 
about whether performance pay is motivating or divisive. Teachers' commitment to their 
schools and their trust of their school leaders are also associated with a more positive 
assessment of performance pay. On the other hand, high work pressure, in the form of above 
median hours of non-directed time, is associated with negative views of performance pay. 
 
It appears that implementation in most schools in the survey is fairly cautious. Although the 
sample numbers are small, most school leaders reported that their schools would reward 
meeting objectives for the current year, and would continue to use whole points on the former 
pay scale. Smaller percentages reported rewarding performance if sustained over several years. 
Most reported they would apply the same types of increase for the Main and Upper Pay 
Scales. Some reported that if allowed they would like to use one-off non-consolidated 
payments. Written-in replies report widespread use of templates from outside providers and 
their associations for teachers' standards and for pay systems. 
 
Despite the negative views of performance pay, teachers' commitment to their schools and 
their students remains high, and arguably higher than in many other sectors of the economy. 
As one respondent wrote: 'No one comes into teaching to get rich'.  
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1. Introduction 
School teachers constitute one of the largest groups of professionally trained employees in 
most advanced economies, and like many other professionals, they are highly educated and 
can exercise considerable autonomy in how they do their jobs. Their work as educators has 
the potential to raise the quality of the national workforce, and to contribute to the future well-
being of their students, Recent research evidence confirms that good teaching has a 
measurable effect upon student achievements (Murphy, 2011 a and b). Hence, understanding 
better how best to reward good teaching concerns both school communities and national and 
local governments.  
 
This paper presents first results of a long-term study to examine the relationship between 
teachers' pay and teaching performance in primary and secondary schools in England and 
Wales. Linking pay to performance is not new for teachers in England and Wales. It has 
existed for school leaders in various forms since the introduction of the new pay structure in 
1991, and was introduced for classroom teachers with the 'Threshold' system in 2000.1 The 
philosophy underlying this system was that practicing teachers should pass through a special 
Threshold Assessment in order to progress from the former Main Scale to a new Upper Pay 
Scale comprising three additional points. This is based on an evaluation of their teaching, 
including an element of pupil performance. Below the Threshold, progress up the Main Scale 
was by seniority, whereas further progress along the Upper Pay Scale was to be performance 
related. The then Education Secretary, Estelle Morris, had pressed for the upper scale to be 
'tapered' so that proportionately higher standards were required for each step. Research 
evidence showed that the Threshold system had some initially positive effects on performance 
(Atkinson et al, 2004, 2009, Marsden and Belfield, 2007). However, reporting in 2012, the 
School Teachers' Pay Review Body (STRB) judged that these had disappeared during the 
subsequent years. The review body observed that very high success rates at the Threshold 
assessment meant that progression had become practically automatic. 2 It recommended a 
reinvigorated link between pay and performance for all classroom teachers in England and 
Wales (STRB, 2012), and greater flexibility for Threshold progression. 
 
Introduced in 2013/2014, the new scheme links salary progression on the Main Pay Scale to 
performance, thus replacing progression by seniority, and providing more flexible pay scales 
(DfE 2013). It also seeks to reinvigorate the link with performance for the Threshold 
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Assessment and for progression along the Upper Pay Scale. Schools have been given greater 
autonomy as to how they determine performance criteria and the methods of assessment. In 
addition, they will no longer be bound by scale points, national pay fixing being confined to 
determining the minimum and maximum salaries for each scale. Although the new scheme 
links pay progression to teachers' performance reviews in schools in both England and Wales, 
there are some important differences in how it operates between the two countries. 
 
Teachers' performance is assessed by means of reviews conducted by senior colleagues, who 
may themselves be classroom teachers, especially in large schools. In these performance 
reviews, teachers discuss their objectives for the coming year, and their performance is 
appraised against those of the previous period as well as against teachers' standards. 
Individual teachers' objectives are meant to be related to their school's general objectives as 
set out in the School Development Plan, and the system is designed to link objectives of 
individual teachers with those of their school as a whole. In theory, the discussion can be two-
way, covering both agreeing objectives and determining what forms of organisational support 
will be provided, such as further professional development. When performance reviews and 
the Threshold were introduced, many teachers feared that formulaic targets, based on student 
test scores, would be imposed on them, despite guidance to the contrary from the DfEE 
(1999). 
 
General oversight of the appraisal system within each school is the responsibility of the 
school's governing body to which the head reports. The quality of the performance review 
system, both within schools and nationally, is also subject to the scrutiny of the national 
school inspectorates, Ofsted in England and Estyn in Wales.  
 
The survey was carried out by online questionnaire to teachers in England and Wales in late 
January-March 2014. Because there is no generally available list of teachers' addresses, the 
classroom and head teacher professional associations informed their members of the study 
either by emailing a random sample of their members, or by newsletter, or a combination of 
the two. The communication was accompanied by a note informing teachers that all the 
professional associations, the national governors' association and the Local Government 
employers had expressed a strong interest in the survey's results. Respondents were informed 
that identities of all teachers and their schools would remain strictly confidential. This was 
important because the introduction of performance-linked pay progression was the subject of 
dispute between some of the teachers' unions and the government at the time of the survey. 
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Two questionnaires were administered, one to classroom teachers seeking their views on 
performance pay, appraisal, and its relationship with their work and their school management, 
and one to school leaders focusing more on management aspects of the new scheme and how 
it would integrate with existing provisions. The survey attracted over 4000 responses from 
classroom teachers and over 200 from school leaders, of which about two-thirds were fully 
completed. The results presented in this paper are unweighted. 
 
Box 1. The Teachers’ pay system up to 2013 and the new implemented in 2013/14 
 
The 2012/13 pay system: In 2012/13 the salaries of classroom teachers in England and Wales 
followed a system introduced in 2000 and developed over subsequent years according to 
which teachers progressed up the Main Scale by a series of increments based on years' 
experience until they reached the point for transition to their Upper Pay Scale. This transition 
involved passing a Threshold Assessment based on their teaching competence, which should 
include an element of student performance, although the then government faced strong 
opposition on this point. Progression on the Upper Pay Scale is related to performance. When 
the 2012 School Teachers’ Review Body (STRB) reported, it observed that the system had 
become somewhat bureaucratic and rigid, and it recommended a reinvigoration of the link 
between pay progression and performance both to help motivate teachers and to assist 
recruitment by offering better pay prospects to good graduates. 
 
The new scheme, introduced during 2013/14, and to apply to salary progression decisions in 
the summer of 2014, follows the recommendations of the School Teachers’ Pay Review Body 
Report 2012, namely: 
• Differentiated performance-based progression on the main pay scale to enable teachers 
to progress at different speeds, with higher rewards and more rapid progression for the 
most able teachers. 
• More flexible performance-based progression to and within the upper pay scale, 
assessed against substantially simplified criteria, enabling abolition of the bureaucratic 
post threshold standards. 
• Local discretion to pay a higher salary to the most successful teachers if a post (akin to 
the ‘Advanced Skills Teachers’) is required and meets simple yet demanding criteria 
on leading improvement of teaching skills. 
(STRB 2012 Para 4.61) 
 
It also proposes new more flexible criteria for progression from the Main to the Upper Pay 
Scale (to replace the former Threshold system) 
• Substantial and sustained achievement of objectives, appropriate skills and 
competence in all elements of the Teachers’ Standards, and 
• The potential and commitment to undertake professional duties which make a wider 
contribution (which involves working with adults) beyond their own classroom. 
(STRB 2012 Para 4.72)  
 
 
8  
2. Arguments for and against linking pay to performance in schools 
The quality of teaching is widely believed to be a major factor in the quality of education 
received by students. It is also widely believed that well-trained and highly motivated teachers 
are key ingredients of teaching quality (Murphy, 2011a, b). Many of those engaged in public 
policy, including in many OECD countries, believe that pay and performance management for 
teachers can make an important contribution provided the right system can be found (OECD, 
2005). This view has been taken in Britain by successive governments and in several reports 
of the School Teachers’ Pay Review Body, for example in 1999, 2007 and 2012. 
 
Research on performance pay for teachers comprises a number of interrelated strands. 
Although each may be logically distinct, many practitioners would regard them as dealing 
with different, but complementary, facets of school life, and posing difficult trade-offs for 
both classroom teachers and school leaders. The first strand is based largely on research up to 
the late 1990s which was broadly sceptical. Murnane and Cohen (1986), concluded that 
performance pay had not spread greatly in the US, despite a number of experiments, because 
it was not suited to the special nature of teachers’ work. Richardson (1999), and Dolton et al 
(2003) reached similar conclusions reviewing British evidence. Teaching involves teamwork; 
attempts to link pay to student results mechanistically can be divisive, and may encourage 
‘teaching to the test’ and grade inflation. Although pay levels are a frequent source of 
dissatisfaction among teachers, financial incentives are not a major source of motivation 
(Vaarlem et al. 1992); many teachers have other intrinsic sources of motivation, such as a 
sense of achievement. As one head teacher respondent to the present survey wrote in: 'No one 
comes into teaching to get rich' (#174). 
 
For the second strand, more recent work by economists suggests that teachers may improve 
their teaching in response to financial incentives (for example: Atkinson et al, 2004, and Lavy, 
2004, 2009, Muralidharan et al., 2011, and Podgursky, 2007). Lazear’s (1996) study showed 
that enhanced performance rewards may also contribute to recruiting high productivity 
employees. Lavy’s study additionally explores some of the methods by which teachers sought 
to respond to the incentives, such as improved pedagogy, increased effort, and focussing on 
particular groups of students. In this vein, one head teacher commented that it will 'enable 
schools to give rewards for good performance' (#48). However, several others commented on 
the risks: budgetary restrictions could make it hard to fund performance pay (#313), and one 
warned that 'additional pay does not motivate to the degree that non-payment risks 
demotivation' (#120). 
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The third strand draws on the management literature, and takes another angle on the question. 
It looks at how the ways in which teachers’ classroom goals are determined and evaluated 
affect performance outcomes. Folger and Cropanzano (2001) argue that employee perceptions 
of the fairness of the methods by which goals are set and performance evaluated play a critical 
role in their effectiveness. If teachers believe management lacks the competence to undertake 
these processes, or is biased in its evaluations, then the outcome could as easily demotivate 
them. Reviewing research on employee appraisal, Levy and Williams (2004) argue that 
employee voice plays an important part in making goal-setting and appraisal effective: top-
down imposition of goals by management, and appraisal against these is less effective than 
involving employees in both the setting and the feedback. A similar point is made in relation 
to goal setting by Locke and Latham (2002): employees are more likely to take ownership of 
their work goals if they have been involved in their selection, and the goals are also more 
likely to be based on better information. One head commented that the new system was 
making teachers take appraisal 'much more seriously and [...] clearer about the improvements 
they need to make' (#141), and several commented on the need for fairness and transparency. 
 
The fourth strand relates to the role of professional influences on teachers’ work. In 
professional occupations, workers' expert knowledge gives them a major advantage over both 
the employer and recipients of their services. There is wide scope for self-seeking behaviour, 
that is, taking advantage of such knowledge to reduce effort and provide a sub-standard 
service (Kleiner, 2006). Often this is restrained by professional norms learned during training 
and by socialisation within the profession. On the other hand, professional norms may conflict 
with organisational priorities. For example, school leaders may want improved exam success 
for their schools whereas teachers may want to promote their pupils' intrinsic interest in their 
subjects. The process of reconciling organisational and professional priorities can be 
discussed at employer and union level, but the critical level which affects how work priorities 
are applied in the classroom needs discussion between individual teachers with school leaders. 
Unless individual teachers agree to changes in work priorities, they are hard to enforce. Thus, 
the appraisal and goal-setting process includes and element of negotiation, requiring give and 
take on both sides (Marsden 2004). One head wrote of the performance reviews as a 
'supportive process' in which it is possible to 'celebrate teachers' achievements and 
contribution to our school... [and].. discuss career aspirations and for us to plan CPD to help 
them achieve their goals' (#22).  
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A fifth strand relates to the internal organisational pressures on management to be lenient, 
which can be a common problem with performance pay based on appraisals by line-managers. 
The need for cooperation from their staff in order to be able to do their own jobs, can 
sometimes cause managers to lenient with appraisals, and to award performance pay on the 
basis of seniority. These may be held in check by the external pressures on schools from 
public inspection reports, and from a quasi-market informed by public data on school 
performance, which families may use when selecting schools. This gives schools an incentive 
to achieve good results and to develop identities for particular types of education 
(Glennerster, 2002). One may hypothesise that the stiffer local competition from 
neighbouring schools, the greater the pressure on school leadership teams to use goal setting 
and appraisal effectively. Nevertheless, as one head commented on the different values in 
education and that 'schools' appraisal can't be like Barclays' appraisal system' (#55). 
 
The head teacher comments illustrate the way in which each of these theoretical concerns has 
a practical echo in the daily lives of schools. At the same time, the existing system has many 
weaknesses. This is reflected in the comments of head teachers concerning how to reward 
teachers who are at the top of their respective pay scales, where incremental progression runs 
out. One head commented that: 'not everyone can be a director or manager!' (#48). Others 
commented on the unfairness of teachers at the top of their scale who appeared to be working 
less hard than their more junior colleagues, as one put it: 'this is where the perceived 
unfairness is in my school and other local schools' (#41). 
 
This study explores the potential effects of performance pay by means of a number of 
indicators. Some are attitudinal and relate to potential effects on teachers' motivation. The 
latter are widely used by researchers in management and organisational psychology on the 
ground that motivation precedes action. Others relate to work behaviour, such as the 
prioritisation of different tasks in the classroom relate directly to performance, and the use of 
non-directed time. All types of effects need to be considered because employees' performance 
may sometimes improve even without their positive motivation, for example, as a result of 
increased management pressure or tougher economic conditions. 
 
The provisional results reported in this paper start by looking at whether teachers believe that 
the new system gives them an incentive to sustain or improve their performance, thus whether 
they agree with the principle, whether they think it will make pay fairer, and whether they 
think their schools can deliver. It then looks at some of the factors influencing teachers' 
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responses, notably how their position on the existing pay scales affects their perceptions of 
the chance of benefiting or of losing out under the new scheme. It also considers some of the 
arguments about teachers' work orientations, and whether these affect their attitudes to 
performance pay, notably whether those with extrinsic or intrinsic orientations make them 
more or less favourable to financial incentives, and how far their commitment to their schools 
and trust in their school leaders affects these attitudes. The report then goes on to look at the 
appraisal system, as this will be the key link between performance and reward. It asks how 
well it functions, and also whether appraisal and objective setting, as presently construed, 
focus on the activities that teachers believe affect performance, and whether it has had a direct 
effect upon their teaching practice. In other words, do appraisal and objective setting as 
currently undertaken provide the basis for an effective link between performance and reward. 
The report then looks at the potential impact of performance pay on teachers' work priorities, 
using how they allocate their non-directed time between different school activities. The next 
step is to examine the responses from school leaders, notably on the risks and opportunities of 
performance pay, and about changes in their schools in preparation for implementation. The 
paper then concludes with an overview of the main issues at this early stage of the research. 
3. Preliminary results on teachers' attitudes to PRP 
The main psychological theories of work performance stress the importance of motivation. 
For example, Edward Lawlers's 'expectancy theory' argues that to be motivated, employees 
have to value the rewards, have scope to increase their performance by greater effort or skill, 
and believe that management is both capable of identifying good performance, and will play 
fair by doing so. Hence, a natural point to start is by asking teachers whether they believe the 
new scheme will motivate them. 
3.1 Teachers' views on performance pay overall 
About 60% of the teachers responding to the survey said they opposed the principle of linking 
pay to performance for teachers (Q1, Table 1). A similar percentage disagreed that it provides 
proper reward to good teaching (Q2), and nearly 80% disagreed that it would result in a fairer 
allocation of pay within schools (Q3).  These percentages are broadly similar to those 
recorded at a similar point before the first outcomes of the Threshold system in 2000. 
Previous research by the Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) also showed that the 
teaching profession was more sceptical about the suitability of performance related pay to 
their work than other groups of public employees (Marsden and French 1998).  
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Associated with this general scepticism about performance pay in principle are negative views 
about its value as an incentive and whether schools can deliver. Few thought it would give an 
incentive to improve the quality of their teaching (Q5), and encourage them to remain in 
teaching (Q6). There was also scepticism that it would make them take their performance 
reviews more seriously (Q4). Many thought that its individual focus would conflict with 
team-working (Q7), and many thought their schools could not afford to pay for improved 
performance (Q8), and feared that school leaders would use it to reward their favourites (Q9). 
The percentages show a similar pattern to that prevailing at the same point before the 
Threshold was introduced in 2000. 
 
The last two questions in Table 1 relate to teachers' views concerning teacher performance: 
that good teaching does make a difference to their students' achievements (Q11), and more 
importantly, that there is significant variation in teaching effectiveness among experienced 
teachers in their schools (Q12). This shows that despite their scepticism about paying for 
performance, respondents recognise that there are real differences in teacher performance. 
These percentages are also comparable with those found in 2000. 
 
These attitudes reflect a particular point in time, and in its follow-up work on the Threshold 
system in 2001 and 2004, the CEP researchers found that some of the initial hostility did 
moderate as the new system settled in, and teachers became more familiar with its operation. 
Teachers' initial fears that the Threshold and upper pay scale performance would be assessed 
in a formulaic way did not materialise in most schools, and in a growing proportion of schools, 
appraisal and objective setting appeared to develop into an effective dialogue. On the other 
hand, it has been argued that the very high rates of success at the Threshold assessment 
allayed teachers' initial fears of failure. Nevertheless, some replies give concern. The initial 
concerns in 2000 about affordability were met by new money to pay for the numbers passing 
the Threshold and progressing on the new Upper Pay Scale. 3 At the present time, there is very 
little extra money for performance pay so teachers may fear that either they will not get any 
performance pay, or that it will be funded by redistributing money within schools' current pay 
bills. Such fears could underlie the replies about favouritism, which at first sight might seem 
surprising given that the appraisal system, on which performance pay progression will be 
based, has now been in operation for almost 15 years. The next section explores some of the 
differences among teachers that might underlie these patterns. It starts with their position on 
the pay scales, and then considers their work orientation and questions of workplace 
atmosphere in terms of commitment and trust in leaders. 
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Table 1. Teachers' views about linking pay to performance in schools 
 Linking pay progression to performance:  Disagree Neutral Agree 
 Fairness and recognition     
1 It is a good principle. 2014 59.7 16.8 23.5 
 
 2000 63.6 11.9 24.5 
2 It means that good teaching is properly rewarded. 2014 64.3 14.0 21.6 
 
 2000 53.7 20.7 25.6 
3 It will result in a fairer allocation of pay. 2014 79.3 12.4 8.3 
 
 2000 73.1 15.3 11.5 
 Incentives and retention     
4 It will make me take the objectives of my performance review more 
seriously. 2014 57.1 20.7 22.2 
 
 2000 48.4 28.7 22.9 
5 It will give me a real incentive to improve/sustain the quality of my 
teaching. 2014 73.8 18.5 7.6 
 
 2000 80.0 8.4 11.6 
6 It makes it more attractive for me to remain a teacher. 2014 82.9 12.1 5.0 
 
 2000 54.4 23.0 22.5 
 Perceptions of delivery     
7 The link is problematic because it is hard to relate the work done in 
schools to individual performance. 2014 4.7 8.4 87.0 
 
 2000 4.4 5.6 90.0 
8 Even if my performance is good enough, I doubt if my school can 
afford to reward me with a pay rise. 2014 8.3 18.9 72.8 
 
 2000 4.4 9.2 86.5 
9 Leaders will use performance pay to reward their favourites. 2014 10.4 20.0 69.6 
 
 2000 15.7 29.3 55.1 
 Pupil performance and effective teaching     
10 It is good that individual teachers' pay should take some account of 
pupil performance. 2014 55.8 21.6 22.6 
 
 2000 57.1 17.4 25.5 
11 Teachers who do their jobs well make a real difference to their 
pupils' learning. 2014 1.5 7.1 91.5 
 
 2000 0.8 1.7 97.4 
12 There is significant variation in teaching effectiveness among 
experienced teachers in my school. 2014 18.3 27.0 54.8 
 
 2000 24.5 16.5 59.0 
Notes: response to questions: in 2000, c 4,200, and in 2014, c. 2,950, excluding missing cases. Year 2000 
responses were weighted by sample fractions by school type; 2014, overall random sample of individual teachers. 
 
3.2 Attitudes to performance pay and position on the teachers' pay scales 
 
Teachers' positions on their respective pay scales influence the opportunities and risks they 
experience with the new scheme. Those at the bottom of the Main Scale may have an 
opportunity to progress more rapidly than in the past, and the new provisions designed to 
simplify Threshold assessment may influence their views, either making it appear easier, or 
more difficult depending on how the changes are implemented in their schools. Those on the 
Upper Pay Scale, where progression has been performance-related for many years, might be 
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expected to be more relaxed about the new scheme. In fact, both groups of teachers are quite 
negative about performance pay, although Main Scale teachers appear moderately less so 
about all the questions on linking pay to performance (see Table 2). Upper Pay Scale teachers 
are more negative about the questions on fairness and recognition, and more pessimistic on 
delivery, except for possible favouritism where the difference between teachers on either scale 
is small and not statistically significant. Upper Scale teachers are also a bit more negative 
about its effect on incentives and retention than Main Scale teachers. 
 
Table 2 Teachers' views about linking pay to performance in schools: Main Scale 
compared with Upper Pay Scale teachers. 
 Linking pay progression to performance:  Disagree Neutral Agree  
 Fairness and recognition      
1 It is a good principle. Main Scale 53.9 18.6 27.49 
**** 
 
 
Upper 
Scale 63.2 15.9 20.92 
 
2 It means that good teaching is properly rewarded. Main Scale 78.2 12.8 9.02 
**** 
 
 
Upper 
Scale 81.0 11.8 7.22 
 
3 It will result in a fairer allocation of pay. Main Scale 78.2 12.8 9.02 
**** 
 
 
Upper 
Scale 81.0 11.8 7.22 
 
 Incentives and retention      
4 It will make me take the objectives of my performance 
review more seriously. 
Main 
Scale 50.6 21.1 28.29 
**** 
 
 
Upper 
Scale 60.0 20.6 19.44 
 
5 It will give me a real incentive to improve/sustain the 
quality of my teaching. 
Main 
Scale 68.4 20.6 10.98 
**** 
 
 
Upper 
Scale 76.8 17.6 5.65 
 
6 It makes it more attractive for me to remain a teacher. Main Scale 82.6 12.0 5.35 
**** 
 
 
Upper 
Scale 84.0 11.7 4.28 
 
 
     
 
 Perceptions on delivery      
7 The link is problematic because it is hard to relate the 
work done in schools to individual performance. 
Main 
Scale 5.5 8.9 85.62 
** 
 
 
Upper 
Scale 3.7 7.9 88.46 
 
8 Even if my performance is good enough, I doubt if my 
school can afford to reward me with a pay rise. 
Main 
Scale 11.3 20.5 68.17 
**** 
 
 
Upper 
Scale 7.1 18.0 74.94 
 
9 Leaders will use performance pay to reward their 
favourites. 
Main 
Scale 10.6 19.4 69.97 
ns 
 
 
Upper 
Scale 9.1 19.6 71.26 
 
Notes: N=2691-2695; significance levels: at 1%, ****, 2% ***, 5% **, 10% *, ns difference between main scale 
and UPS not significant at 10%. Significance levels calculated on the original five-scale questions. 
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According to the School Workforce Census, in 2012, 15% of teachers were at the top of the 
old Main Scale (point M6), and a further 29% at the top of the Upper Scale (UP3). For the 
latter group in particular, there is limited scope for further progression, and some might fear 
that they could lose out in the new flexibility in school pay awards. To take a closer look at 
how teachers' views change between different points on their salary scale an index based on 
the questions in Table 2 was computed (Figure 1). Factor analysis was used to combine the 
answers to the nine questions and compute an index of how 'motivational' and how 'divisive' 
teachers considered the link between their pay progression and performance. Figure 1 shows 
that negative views on divisiveness peak on Upper Scale point U3, whereas positive views on 
the motivational aspects of linking pay progression to performance peak for teachers on Main 
Scale point M5, and plunge at M6. The dotted lines show the margin of statistical error for 
each index. 
 
Thus, a possible factor behind the greater pessimism of UPS teachers may be that so many of 
them are at the top of their scale, and feel they have little to gain from performance pay. Pay 
insecurity may also have risen for this group because part of the new package on performance 
pay is to remove the guarantee that teachers changing schools will retain their previous salary 
level. In addition, the substitution of a scale with maximum and minimum points, but no 
intervening scale points, also raises the possibility that the pay of teachers on the higher UPS 
points may grow more slowly than the average for their schools, depending on how 
performance pay is implemented. As will be seen later, such fears may be unfounded, in the 
short-run at least, in view of the cautious approach of schools to the new pay arrangements 
(Section 9 below). 
 
Among teachers on the Main Scale, those on M6 in 2014 would have been due to pass their 
Threshold Assessment in 2013/14 under the old arrangements. They will have seen the 
change of rules, and mooted tightening up of the standards for passing, combined with 
increased competition for progression from teachers on lower points on the Main Scale. They 
would therefore feel doubly uncertain about their prospects. With so many teachers on M6 
and UPS3, there is a large group facing uncertainty, and a fear of losing out with the new 
scheme's implementation.  
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Figure 1 Teachers' views on motivation and divisiveness of linking pay progression to 
appraisal 
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Notes: The indexes of whether PRP is motivational or divisive are based on a factor analysis using the questions 
in Table 2. Factor analysis produces an index whose mean is zero, and for which about two-thirds of responses 
fall within plus or minus 1. The dotted lines show the margin of statistical error such that there is a 5% chance 
that the true figure lies outside the range between the upper and lower 95% lines. The wide margin of error for 
motivation and divisiveness for salary points M1-M3 reflects the greater variation among the answers by 
teachers on these points and their smaller sample numbers. 
 
3.3 Teachers' work orientations and performance pay: intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivations 
An important distinction made in the literature on reward systems and motivation is between 
levels of pay that are needed to recruit and retain employees, and how rewards are paid in 
order to incentivise performance (Fernie and Metcalf, 1999). It is possible that although many 
are attracted to teaching by non-pay factors, the way they are paid is can nevertheless be a 
source of dissatisfaction, and this could be a source of general scepticism about the merits of 
performance pay in schools. When asked to identify the three most important factors that 
attracted them to teaching, listed in Table 3, 86% cited the sense of achievement from their 
work among the top three. Turning to their current levels of satisfaction, 68% said they were 
satisfied with their sense of achievement (Table 3, right hand panel). In contrast, 74% cited 
their current workload as one of the three top sources of dissatisfaction with teaching, and 
only 9% were satisfied with their workload. The high degree of satisfaction teachers derive 
from the scope for achievement in their jobs has been observed in previous studies (see 
Varlaam et al 1992, and in previous CEP studies). 'The kids' as a source of satisfaction was 
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one of the most frequently written-in replies in the survey. In common with these studies, 
although pay is not high on the list of factors attracting teachers to the job, only 24% cite it as 
an attraction, nearly 40% of the respondents expressed dissatisfaction over pay.  
 
Table 3 Teachers views on attractiveness of teaching and on current satisfaction  
 
What makes teaching attractive to 
you? 
What is your current level of 
satisfaction? 
 
% citing among 
top 3  
sources of 
attractiveness 
of teaching 
% citing among 
top 3  
sources of 
dissatisfaction  
with teaching 
Dissatisfied 
% 
Neutral 
% 
Satisfied 
% 
The sense of achievement you get 
from your work  86.2 8.3 18.8 13.0 68.3 
The scope for using your own 
initiative  54.5 15.5 24.8 16.4 58.8 
Your job security  36.8 25.6 31.3 24.1 44.6 
The opportunity to develop your 
skills in your job  31.1 18.0 36.2 24.9 38.8 
The amount of influence you have 
over your job  24.4 38.7 43.4 21.8 34.8 
The amount of pay you receive  24.1 23.2 39.6 26.4 34.0 
The training you receive  11.8 31.5 42.1 26.1 31.9 
Your current workload  5.5 74.3 78.2 12.9 9.0 
Attractiveness to teaching: In terms of what attracts you to teaching, what are the three most important sources of 
satisfaction and dissatisfaction for you? (Q2.2 ) Current satisfaction: 'How satisfied are you with the following 
aspects of your job?' (Q2.1).  
Attractiveness question: percentage citing a particular top 3 item out of respondents citing any item in listed in 
Q2_2, n=3377). Current satisfaction: row percentages. (n=3458-3464). 
 
Although most teachers emphasise the intrinsic rewards of helping their students develop, an 
important minority emphasise the extrinsic, material and financial rewards. Comparing these 
two groups enables one to explore the link between such orientations and attitudes to 
performance pay. The features that made teaching attractive were simplified into two broad 
categories: whether they focused on intrinsic aspects of teaching, namely a sense of 
achievement, influence and initiative, or whether they focused on extrinsic aspects, notably 
pay, job security and work load. Teachers who cited at least two of the three intrinsic aspects 
among the three requested were classified as having an intrinsic orientation, and those who 
cited at least two of the three extrinsic ones were classified as extrinsic. The others were 
classified as 'in between'. 
 
In fact, answers to several of the general questions about performance pay for teachers were 
not significantly different between the intrinsic and extrinsic groups: they were small enough  
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Table 4 Teachers' views on linking pay to performance depending on whether they are 
attracted to teaching by intrinsic or extrinsic factors (row percentages) 
 
 Disagree Hard to say Agree Sig 
It makes it more attractive for me to remain a teacher. 
Intrinsic 81.9 12.5 5.6 *** 
In between 85.9 10.5 3.7  
Extrinsic 81.7 13.3 5.0  
     
It will give me a real incentive to improve/sustain the quality of my teaching. 
Intrinsic 73.8 18.7 7.5 ns 
In between 75.5 17.9 6.6  
Extrinsic 71.2 19.0 9.8  
     
Leaders will use performance pay to reward their favourites. 
Intrinsic 10.6 22.1 67.3 ** 
In between 9.2 17.8 73.0  
Extrinsic 10.3 16.4 73.3  
     
It is good that individual teachers' pay should take some account of pupil performance 
Intrinsic 56.9 19.5 23.7 *** 
In between 55.3 24.4 20.3  
Extrinsic 53.4 24.6 22.1  
     
I share many of the values of my organisation 
Intrinsic 9.0 12.7 78.3 **** 
In between 16.0 16.5 67.5  
Extrinsic 12.0 13.7 74.4  
     
Teachers who do their jobs well make a real difference to their pupils' learning. 
Intrinsic 1.1 5.8 93.1 **** 
In between 2.0 8.9 89.1  
Extrinsic 1.9 8.0 90.1  
     
There is significant variation in teaching effectiveness among experienced teachers in my school 
Intrinsic 20.5 26.6 52.9 **** 
In between 15.8 29.5 54.8  
Extrinsic 15.2 24.5 60.4  
 
N: 2921-3075. Significance: **** 1%, ** 5%, ns, not significant at 10%. (note significance based on full five-
point response scale). 
 
to have come about by chance. Table 4 focuses on those that were significantly different. 
Even though some of the differences are quite small, on the whole, teachers in the 'intrinsic 
group' were more likely to think that performance pay makes it more attractive to remain a 
teacher, and were more sympathetic to considering an element of pupil performance in 
performance pay. They were also more likely to share the values of their schools, and to 
believe that good teachers make a difference. However, they were also more likely to be 
concerned about favouritism in awarding performance pay. Teachers in the 'extrinsic group' 
were more likely to think performance pay gives them an incentive to improve their teaching 
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quality. An interesting difference between the two groups can be found in attitudes to 
differences in teaching effectiveness: teachers in the extrinsic group were more likely to 
believe there are such differences in their schools. 
 
3.4 School atmosphere: commitment to the school, and trust in its leaders 
The social environment and teachers' feelings of being part of a group to which they feel 
committed may also affect views on performance pay. It is sometimes argued that use of 
financial incentives can 'crowd out' more pro-social types of motivation (eg Osterloh and Frey, 
2000). Those who undertake many parts of their job 'for the good of the' school as an 
organisation or as a community, may feel that this conflicts with the assumptions of incentive 
pay, that emphasise both the economic side of the exchange, and the contractual authority of 
managers rather than employees using their discretion to contribute to a successful school. 
The most recent evidence comparing teachers with other occupational groups in Britain is 
provided by the Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS) for 2011. This asked a 
sample of teachers how they felt about the organisation they worked for: whether they felt 
proud to work there, if they shared its values, did they feel loyal, and did they use their own 
initiative a lot to carry out tasks that went beyond a strict definition of their jobs. In other 
words, did they feel a sense of commitment to their organisation? The WERS results show 
that many employees across the economy feel committed to the organisations they work for, 
but teachers did so to a greater degree than the others. According to WERS 2011, 81% of 
teachers felt proud of their school, and 87% shared its values and felt loyal to it (Table 5). As 
a result, if we follow the theory of commitment, they regularly used their initiative for the 
good of their organisation (84%). The same questions were asked in the LSE teachers' survey, 
and they also show high levels of commitment among teachers, and where similar questions 
were asked in 2000, they confirmed the picture. One puzzle is the lower level of commitment 
among the LSE survey's respondents. It may be that feelings of commitment have declined 
since 2011, or that asking the same questions in the context of a contested pay system elicits 
different answers. It is also possible that teachers who were more opposed to performance pay 
felt more motivated to complete the questionnaire. 
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Table 5 Commitment to schools by teachers. 
 Disagree Neutral Agree 
I am proud to tell people who I work for 
Teachers 2014 12.3 21.6 66.1 
Teachers 2000 10.7 21.5 67.8 
WERS 2011 teachers 5.3 14.1 80.6 
WERS 2011 all employees (excl teachers) 9.3 23.2 67.6 
    
I share many of the values of my organisation 
Teachers 2014 11.4 14.1 74.6 
WERS 2011 teachers 3.9 8.9 87.2 
WERS 2011 all employees (excl teachers) 7.9 27.7 64.4 
    
I feel loyal to my organisation 
Teachers 2014 12.9 15.3 71.8 
WERS 2011 teachers 4.8 8.1 87.0 
WERS 2011 all employees (excl teachers) 7.9 17.5 74.6 
    
Using my own initiative I carry out tasks that are not  required as part of my job 
Teachers 2014* 3.5 28.0 68.5 
WERS 2011 teachers 3.8 12.4 83.9 
WERS 2011 all employees (excl teachers) 9.1 20.4 70.5 
Notes: * Teachers 2014 classified responses on initiative as 'never', 'sometimes' 'quite often' 
and 'very often'. 'Sometimes' was classified as 'neutral' and quite and very often as 'agree'.  
 
Many of the written-in comments as well as some of the theories reviewed at the start indicate 
a link between feelings of commitment to the school as a collectivity, trust in management to 
be fair, and judgements about whether performance pay is likely to be divisive or a positive 
factor in the school. To look as this association in more detail, indexes were calculated of 
commitment, using the questions in Table 5: those on teachers' perceptions of trust and fair 
dealing by the school's management, and those on the link between pay and performance in 
schools. For a simple cross-tabulation, respondents were then divided according to whether 
their responses were above or below the median (top or bottom 50%) in terms of commitment, 
trust and whether they thought performance pay divisive (Table 6). Thus, among teachers 
who were highly committed, 68% had high trust in their school's leadership, and only 47% 
considered performance pay to be divisive. Likewise, those who trusted their school's 
leadership were less likely to think that performance pay will be divisive.  
 
The quality of the objective setting process is often the weak link in performance pay systems. 
If it is done badly, employees often feel that the system is unfair and arbitrary. A first cut at 
this question was made by taking the more objective questions on teachers' latest objective 
setting meeting, and computing a similar index to those above (see Table 7 below). These 
questions were chosen in preference to the more judgemental ones on this process because 
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they are least likely to be coloured by teachers' views on commitment, trust, and performance 
pay. The questions selected include whether specific objectives had been set, they related to 
the School Development Plan, they included measures of pupil progress, whether how they 
would be monitored was clear, and whether the respondent knew how they would be linked to 
pay progression. The results shown in Table 6 underline the importance of the review system 
in schools. Teachers who experience good objective setting procedures are less likely to 
consider performance pay divisive (45:55%), and more likely to feel committed to their 
schools (56:43%), and to trust their schools' leadership (59:41%). This association bears out 
the idea that objective setting and appraisal play a very important part in building a good 
ethos in schools, and can be the weak link in incentive systems based on peer and 
management evaluation. However, it does not establish causation. For example, it is possible 
that tense relations in schools make it very difficult to conduct an effective appraisal and 
objective setting system.  
 
Table 6 Teachers' judgements about whether performance pay is divisive, commitment 
and trust in school leadership4 (row percentages) 
 Trust in school leaders 
Good objective setting procedures Low High  
Top 50% 40.7 59.3 100 
 Commitment to school 
Good objective setting procedures Low High  
Top 50% 44.3 55.7 100 
 
 Performance pay will be divisive 
Good objective setting procedures Low High  
Top 50% 54.9 45.1 100 
  
Commitment to school Low High T 
Top 50%  53.1 46.9 100 
  
Trust in school leaders Low High  
Top 50% 58.4 41.6 100 
 
 Trust in school leaders 
Commitment to school Low High T 
Top 50% 32.0 68.0 100 
 
N: commitment: 2841 and trust: 2774. Each of the indexes is based on factor analysis of survey questions, and 
the 'Low' and 'High' values correspond to those below or above the median. Commitment questions are in Table 
5, objective setting in Table 7, and performance pay, see footnote 3. 'Top 50%' indicates that the teachers whose 
answers were the 50% most positive (least negative) on the questions. 
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4. Appraisal and objective setting 
As in any system of appraisal-based pay, objective setting and appraisal provide the key link 
between teachers' work and pay progression. This section looks first at the conduct of 
objective setting and appraisal as experienced by teachers. It then looks at teachers' and 
appraisers' views on the outcomes of appraisal: how has it changed teachers' classroom 
practice, and whether it addresses the factors teachers believe underlie differences in teaching 
effectiveness. 
4.1 The conduct of appraisal and objective-setting  
When pay is linked to performance appraisals, it is clearly very important that the appraisal 
process works well. One possible reason for teachers' scepticism about performance pay is 
that they lack confidence in the appraisal process: whether it is taken seriously by their school 
leaders, whether they have a chance to establish what they consider to be realistic and relevant 
goals, and whether it will be fairly operated. 
 
Nearly all respondents (88%) reported having had an objective setting meeting for 2013/14 by 
the time of the survey, and in nearly every case, these set objectives for the coming year 
(Table 7). Allowing for those changing schools, and for possible implementation delays, this 
suggests that the procedures for performance review are operating at least in formal terms. 
However, in the experience of respondents, the quality of the process appears to be more 
variable. On the positive side, objectives are clear and specific, and they relate to wider 
objectives of the school, teachers mostly felt they had the opportunity to discuss their 
objectives and knew how they will be reviewed. And they included indicators of pupil 
progress. On the negative side, a majority of teachers were less certain about whether their 
objectives focused on matters within their control, whether they were fair and reasonable, and 
whether they had much influence over the objectives chosen. A good deal of research on 
performance appraisals (Locke and Latham, 2002, Cawley et al 1998) suggests that employee 
influence on the selection of objectives can be beneficial because it means that the objectives 
chosen are better informed, and that employees are more likely to take ownership of them. A 
separate cross-tabulation of questions in Table 7 shows that teachers who felt they had no 
influence over their objectives were more likely to consider them unfair. Finally, if a 
performance pay system is to motivate, then employees need to know how their performance 
will translate into pay progression. The last question in Table 7 suggests that a great many 
teachers are uncertain on this score, although this may change as the new system becomes 
established. 
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Table 7 Teachers' views about their own objective setting meeting for 2013/14 
(Row percentages) 
 No To some 
extent 
Yes, 
definitely 
Did the meeting establish specific objectives for the current school year? 1.1 19.2 79.7 
Did they relate to the wider objectives in the school, eg., as in the School 
Improvement Plan or department or team plans? 4.5 26.5 69.0 
Did you understand how they will be monitored and reviewed? 9.2 38.9 51.9 
Did you have the opportunity to discuss them with your head or team 
leader?  12.4 32.7 54.9 
Did they include indicators of pupil progress? 4.6 13.3 82.2 
Were they focused on matters over which you have direct control? 16.1 64.1 19.8 
Do you consider them to be fair and reasonable? 23.1 57.3 19.6 
Could you influence which objectives were chosen? 27.1 50.8 22.1 
Do you know how they will be related to your pay progression? 42.2 29.8 28.0 
Notes: Number of responses: 2722-2730 out of 2800 who reported having had  
 
 
4.2 Effects of appraisal on classroom practice 
Turning to the outcomes from appraisals, teachers were asked whether appraisal had led 
directly to changes in different aspects of their classroom practice, including such items as 
classroom management, instructional practices, handling student discipline, and focusing on 
improving student test scores. If appraisal is to improve performance, then one would expect 
it to work through concrete changes in such practices. One of the key findings of Lavy's (2009) 
study was to trace a path from the incentive scheme in his sample of Israeli schools through 
classroom practices to student performance. The list of practices in Table 8 is close to that 
used in the OECD's TALIS international study of schools to enable future comparisons 
(OECD, 2010). The great majority of teachers reported either no change or a small change, 
suggesting that objective setting and appraisal are not widely used to address these questions, 
or if they are, the effect is relatively small. It is possible that pre-Threshold teachers would 
benefit more from such advice than experienced teachers such as those on the Upper Pay 
Scale. However, a first test cross-tabulating each of the practices in Table 8 with whether or 
not a teacher was on the Upper Pay Scale showed there were no statistically significant 
differences. 
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Table 8 Teachers' views on how appraisal and objective setting at their school has 
changed various aspects of their teaching. 
(Row percentages) 
 
No 
change  
A small 
change  
A moderate 
change  
A large 
change  
Not 
applicable  
Your classroom management practices  46.4 22.3 18.9 8.4 4.0 
Your knowledge and understanding of 
your main area or subject field  65.6 14.5 11.2 4.8 3.9 
Your knowledge and understanding of 
instructional practices in your area  58.3 18.6 13.7 4.4 5.0 
Your development or training plan to 
improve your teaching  49.7 24.2 15.7 6.1 4.2 
Your handling of student discipline and 
behaviour problems  73.3 11.9 6.9 3.3 4.6 
Your teaching of students with special 
learning needs  65.3 16.1 8.9 4.4 5.2 
Your teaching students in a multicultural 
setting  76.7 5.7 3.3 1.2 13.1 
The emphasis you place on improving 
student test scores in your teaching  29.2 15.2 19.7 30.9 5.0 
Notes: Question: Has the process of appraisal and objective setting at this school directly led to, or involved, 
changes in any of the following aspects of your teaching? Number of responses: 3124-3136. 
 
4.3 Does appraisal address the factors underlying differences in teaching effectiveness  
A second test of how effective a link appraisal and objective setting could establish between 
pay and performance is to consider how appraisal deals with the reasons attributed to 
variations in teaching effectiveness (Table 1 Q12). Providing support to less effective teachers 
is one way in which schools can raise their overall performance. The results of the current 
survey are shown in Table 9 for both classroom and head teachers. They are broadly similar 
between the two groups and for 2000 and 2014. The main difference is that classroom 
teachers place more emphasis on workload difficulties. This may be because head teachers 
have a more synoptic view of the link between workload and effectiveness than classroom 
teachers especially in large schools. Another possible factor is the current level of concern 
among teachers about workloads (see Table 3 above). 
 
As in 2000, differences in teaching skills and in the ability to motivate their pupils are among 
the most important reasons, and so one might think that improved professional development 
would be the most suitable remedy. The ability to motivate pupils in most cases would seem 
also to be a skill that can be learned. Morale and motivation are often somewhat diffuse issues 
that need to be explored in order to find remedies, as is often the case with workload problems. 
Thus, these would seem to be issues for which financial incentives may have an indirect effect, 
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but the appraisal and objective setting meetings would seem necessary in order to give them 
focus.  
 
Table 9 Reasons given for differences in teaching effectiveness among experienced 
teachers in their school (column percentages) 
 Classroom teachers Head teachers 
 
Main reason 
2014 
Second reason 
2014 
Main reason 
2000 
Main reason 
2014 
Main reason 
2000 
    
  
Differences in teaching 
skills 24.4 18.8 23.5 50 44 
Differences in motivation 
and morale 28.7 28.8 31.5 19 24 
Differences in age 2.1 5.1 1.4 1 1 
Differences in the ability 
to motivate pupils 9.9 16.6 21.3 18 18 
Difficult workload 32.8 25.3 12.8 5 6 
Other 2.2 - 5.9 7 7 
Multiple reasons   3.6   
N  2853 2644 3055 95 260 
Source: 2000 and 2014 surveys 
 
To explore the issues addressed by appraisals and objective setting, head teachers and 
classroom teachers and who had carried out appraisals were asked how appraisal had 
addressed a number of issues, including those teachers thought related to teaching 
effectiveness (Table 10). Both groups think that they contribute to teaching effectiveness by 
means of professional development, imparting a sharper focus on work priorities, and relating 
them to those of their school. Both groups also thought that the reviews provide an  
 
Table 10 Appraiser and head teacher views on how appraisal has helped in their school 
 
APPRAISERS (Classroom 
teachers) Head Teachers 
 No Hard to 
say Yes No 
Hard to 
say Yes 
Appraisals help:       
More systematic focus on work priorities  26.2 22.6 51.2 7.7 21.2 71.2 
Opportunity to discuss poor performance  23.4 20.0 56.6 18.8 20.0 64.7 
Address problems of teacher morale or 
motivation  55.3 20.6 24.2 45.4 23.7 30.9 
Identify and resolve difficult workload issues 65.5 16.4 18.1  Na  
Teachers with difficulty motivating students 48.1 27.1 24.8 47.7 31.1 21.2 
With professional development needs   na  15.1 17.0 68.0 
With difficult workloads  Na  46.4 33.1 20.5 
Notes: respondents: Classroom teachers 944, Head teachers: 170 
 
opportunity to discuss issues related to poor performance, and help identify teachers 
professional development needs. In contrast, most appraisers thought that reviews did not help 
them to address problems of teacher motivation and morale, difficulty to motivate students, 
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and workload. It is perhaps a reflection of this that only one fifth thought reviews represented 
good value for money in terms of the time invested in them. 
 
In summary, while the appraisal process appears to do well on the elements specified in 
regulations, it appears to do less well, according to teachers, on the supportive elements, and 
according to appraisers, it appears to provide only limited help in tackling some of the sources 
of less effective teaching. It also appeared to score modestly on stimulating changes in 
classroom practices that might lead to improved teaching, with the notable exception of a 
greater emphasis on improving students' test scores. 
5. Work priorities and teachers' use of non-directed hours  
One of the aims of appraisal and objective setting, backed up by performance pay, is to 
facilitate alignment of teachers' classroom objectives with those of their schools. Clearly, no 
school relies exclusively on appraisal to achieve this, and there are many other occasions 
when teachers and team leaders work together on objectives, but the justification of appraisal 
related pay progression is that it should support this process. Such discussions are particularly 
important in occupations where employees are relied upon to exercise a good deal of 
discretion in their jobs, as this relies on agreed priorities. One notable area of work discretion 
in schools concerns teachers' non-directed hours. These relate to non-timetabled activities 
which are a required part of a teacher's job, and because time allocation depends on a teacher's 
discretion it will reflect their work priorities. Thus, an increased emphasis on student results 
might lead teachers to allocate more of their discretionary time to lesson preparation, whereas 
if the emphasis were on subject knowledge or instructional techniques they might allocate 
more time to professional development. To explore this question more fully, we shall need to 
await the findings of the second wave of this study, after performance pay has been fully 
introduced. Nevertheless, preliminary results from the first wave illustrate the potential for 
change in teachers' working time allocation.  
 
Among respondents, the median full-time teacher worked 18 hours a week of non-directed 
time. This was spread across a number of activities, ranging from lesson preparation through 
to individual professional development (Table 11). With some allowance for answers based 
on memory, it is clear that more than half of non-directed time is used for lesson preparation 
and student feedback, followed by administration and meetings, as indeed it was in the 2000 
survey. These are averages for all teachers, and there are variations: for example more 
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experienced teachers need to do less preparation, but they also spend more time on leadership 
activities. 
 
Respondents were asked to select the two main reasons for undertaking these activities (Table 
12). Giving a high quality of education is prominent among the replies in both 2014 and 2000, 
especially for lesson preparation and seeing parents and pupils. This is consistent with the 
large numbers reporting that the sense of achievement and other intrinsic aspects of their work 
attracted them to teaching. Signs of work pressure are also apparent: 'getting the work done' 
for preparation and administrative activities. There also appears to be a subtle change from 
2000 in terms of management direction becoming more prominent for meetings, 
administration and professional development in 2014 compared with benefiting the school 
and quality of education in 2000. In 2000, the performance review system was in the process 
of being set up, and so did not figure among the reasons for use of non-directed time. 
However, in 2014, meeting objectives of the performance review had become the most 
important reason cited for individual professional development, displacing the more diffuse 
and less directed idea of 'quality of education'. 
 
Table 11. Distribution of non-directed time across different activities. 
Non-directed activity Percent of non-directed time 2014 
% non-directed 
time 2000 
Lesson preparation and marking (including report writing, pupil 
records, etc)  54.8% 54 
General administrative tasks (e.g organising resources, general record-
keeping, photocopying) 16.2% 14 
School/staff management meetings, management activities etc 
(including appraising staff)  11.1% 11 
Seeing parents and pupils outside class time (e.g for additional help 
with work, guidance) 7.7% 10 
Involvement in school clubs, sports, orchestras etc. 5.1% 5 
Individual & professional development activities (e.g professional 
reading, courses, conferences, and being trained or being appraised) 5.1% 5 
Total % 100 100 
Hours (non-directed time) 18.4 17 
N 2989 3939 
Notes: Data for 2000 from Marsden (2000: Table 3). Percentages of hours computed on the basis of the total 
hours teachers reported for each activity. Total non-directed hours as reported in the survey returns, and relate to 
the most recent full teaching week at the time of the survey. Total hours based on full-time teachers. Percentages 
of time use for full and part-time teachers. 
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Table 12 Most important reasons for undertaking selected activities outside directed 
hours 
 2014  2000  
 Main reason Second reason Main reason Second reason 
Lesson preparation 
etc. 
Quality of education 
(50%) 
Get the work done 
(22%) 
Quality of 
education Get the work done 
General 
administrative tasks 
Get the work done 
(47%) 
Management 
pressure (12%) 
Get the work 
done Benefit the school 
School/staff 
management 
meetings etc  
Management 
pressure (32%) 
Activities occur 
after school hours 
(25%) 
Management 
pressure Benefit the school 
Seeing parents and 
pupils outside class 
time  
Activities occur after 
school hours (23%) 
Quality of education 
(20%) 
Activities occur 
after school 
hours 
Quality of education 
& don't want to let 
down colleagues & 
students 
Involvement in 
school clubs etc 
Activities occur after 
school hours (22%) 
Benefit of my school 
(19%) & enjoy the 
work (18%) 
Activities occur 
after school 
hours 
Benefit of my school 
& enjoy the work 
Individual 
professional 
development 
activities  
Meet the objectives 
of my performance 
review (17%) 
Activities occur 
after school hours 
(14%) 
Quality of 
education 
Activities occur after 
school hours 
Other     
Notes: 2000 data from Marsden (2000 Table 3). 
 
The potential effect of performance management on teachers' work priorities can be illustrated 
by the introduction of the Threshold in 2000 on how teachers allocated their time between 
different activities, and notably towards lesson preparation. In 2000, it concentrated the 'prize' 
for good performance at the top of the old Main Scale, Point 9. 5 With the 2000 reforms, 
teachers approaching the Threshold had the prospect of moving onto the new Upper Pay Scale. 
The results of both the CEP study (Marsden and Belfield, 2007), and that of Atkinson et al. 
(2007), using different methodologies, suggested that the Threshold did have an impact on 
teachers' work and contributed to improved test results for their students. Atkinson et al 
emphasised the incentives for individual teachers eligible for the Threshold, whereas Marsden 
and Belfield highlighted more general improvements in coordinating teachers' and school 
goals through performance review. These are not mutually exclusive, and the impact can be 
seen in increased allocation of non-directed time to lesson preparation, that is activities that 
were likely to be most beneficial for passing the Threshold. At the time, there was much 
discussion of including measures pupil progress as part of the assessment. 
 
Figure 2 shows that in the run-up to Point 9, where most teachers could apply for the 
Threshold, there was a moderate increase of about three percentage points to 55.5% of non-
directed time. Because many teachers also held responsibility points, the second series shows 
the percentage of preparation time by scale point excluding responsibility points, and so gives 
an approximation to what were then called 'experience points' of which there were nine.6 This 
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series may also include the effect of points awarded for other types of duties, and it is possible 
too that some respondents misreported their responsibility points. Nevertheless, with some 
allowance for potential inaccuracies, both series show that teaching preparation time 
increased in the run-up to Threshold eligibility in 2000. A separate analysis of total non-
directed hours by scale point for both series shows no equivalent increase between points 8 
and 9, so one may conclude that the extra time for lesson preparation was diverted from other 
activities. Teachers were changing their work priorities in response to the Threshold.7 
 
The 2012 School Teachers' Pay Review Body took the view that any performance link for the 
Threshold and indeed of Upper Pay Scale progression had been lost during the subsequent 
decade. Figure 3 shows the distribution of non-directed time between different activities by 
scale point in 2014. Although the new provisions for the Threshold give schools greater 
flexibility as to its timing for individual Main Scale teachers, evidence in Section 7 below 
suggests that many schools' are starting cautiously, so that widespread use of early Threshold 
assessment seems unlikely. Therefore, one might have expected to see a similar peak in 2014 
to that in 2000, which is not apparent in Figure 3. This may be a result of the considerable 
uncertainty at the time of the survey about how the new system will operate, as many teachers 
did not know how their appraisal would relate to pay (see Table 7, last line). Nevertheless, 
there was also a great deal of uncertainty in 2000 about future operation. The chart may also 
reflect the STRB's view that the performance link in teachers' pay progression has faded.  
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Figure 2 Non-directed time (%) on lesson preparation etc. by salary scale point: 2000. 
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Notes: weighted sample, for wave 1, 2000.  
 
Figure 3 Non-directed time (%) spent on different activities, by salary scale point: 2014. 
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Apart from the decline in preparation time as teachers progress up the scale, which may be 
linked to increasing experience, there is an increased proportion of time spent on coordinating 
activities (meetings), and which include appraisals. The other notable point is the gradual 
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increase in the share of time devoted to continuous professional development (CPD), once 
teachers have passed their induction stage at point M1. This is displayed in more detail in 
Figure 4. A question to be explored later in this research is how far this reflects an emphasis 
on CPD in appraisals and objective setting: part of the organisational support offered to 
teachers to help them achieve agreed objectives, mentioned earlier.  
 
Figure 4 Percent of non-directed time spent on CPD activities by salary scale point 
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6. Overview and interrelationships  
So far, a number of facets of performance pay and appraisal have been examined separately. 
This section seeks to provide a first view of some of the interrelationships. It also provides an 
opportunity to see how work pressure, which emerged as a major source of dissatisfaction in 
Table 3, might colour some of the interrelationships between pay, appraisal, and the work 
environment.  For example, it was mentioned that schools may find it difficult to run a good 
appraisal system in a tense work environment. High workloads could be one factor, reflecting 
an imbalance between the pressures on some schools and their resources. Their effect is 
explored using the number of non-directed hours worked as their reporting is unlikely to be 
biased by views on appraisal and performance pay. High work pressure would make the 
environment for objective setting and appraisal difficult, and so could underlie the earlier 
observation of a link between appraisal quality, commitment, and views on performance pay 
(Table 6 above).8  
32  
 
To explore this relationship, the same questions are used as in Table 8 on the experience of 
performance reviews. They were combined in an index of these two dimensions using factor 
analysis: whether key procedures were followed and how supportive they were. The 
responses were divided into those above and below the median: comparing the top 50% and 
bottom 50% of appraisals in terms of appraisal procedures and supportiveness. The same 
procedure was used earlier for commitment and intrinsic motivation. Position on the teachers' 
pay spine was included because that has already been seen to influence attitudes to 
performance pay. Gender is included because one might expect women teachers to experience 
greater pressure from family commitments than their male counterparts, and so find 
performance pay more challenging. Finally, working above median non-directed hours is 
taken as an indicator of work pressure, and above median percentage of time on CPD 
activities could be seen as a measure of organisational support provided by schools. A logit 
regression using all these variables was carried out to show how they relate to the probability 
of teachers judging PRP either motivational or divisive. The coefficients in the top row show 
that experiencing the best 50% of appraisal procedures is associated with a 5% increase the 
likelihood that teachers will be more favourable to PRP, and a 10% reduction in the likelihood 
that they will find it divisive. The 50% of teachers most committed to their schools are 7% 
more likely to judge PRP to be motivational, and 4% less likely to judge it divisive. 
 
Turning to the current pay scales, teachers on the Upper Pay Scale appear to be the most 
sceptical of any motivational benefits of PRP and those most convinced of its divisiveness: 
20% less likely to judge it motivational, and 13% more likely to judge it divisive. Despite the 
competing pressures on women teachers' time, they appear more favourable to PRP than men. 
In the present very limited analysis, the type of school does not seem to make much 
difference, whether primary or secondary, and whether or not an academy. 
 
Finally, the 50% of teachers working the most non-directed hours are 8% less likely to judge 
PRP motivational and 5% more likely to consider it divisive. In a similar regression, in the 
lower panel of Table 13, teachers working above median non-directed hours were 10% less 
likely to find objective setting and appraisal supportive. A similar result, not shown in the 
Table, was found when using the question on teachers' dissatisfaction with their current 
workloads. 
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Table 13 Factors associated with more positive motivational, and more negative divisive 
views of performance pay for teachers (full-time only). 
 
More favourable  
to PRP 
Signific-
ance 
PRP is divisive Signific-
ance 
Good objective setting 
procedures 0.053 ** -0.106 **** 
Commitment to school 0.070 **** -0.043 * 
Intrinsic motivation 0.025 - -0.015 - 
Upper Pay Scale -0.203 **** 0.127 *** 
Main Pay Scale 0.110 * 0.057 - 
Unqualified Teacher 
Scale 0.027 - 0.190 - 
Female 0.142 **** -0.048 * 
Primary school -0.006 - -0.033 - 
Above median non-
directed hours -0.076 **** 0.053 ** 
Above median % CPD 
hours 0.057 ** -0.016 - 
N 1863  1883  
Pseudo R2 0.0348  0.0193  
     
 
Good objective setting 
procedures  
Supportive objective setting 
procedures  
Upper Pay Scale 0.002 - -0.108 * 
Main Pay Scale -0.123 ** -0.056 - 
Female 0.025 - -0.013 - 
Primary school 0.064 *** -0.014 - 
Above median non-
directed hours 0.028 - -0.100 **** 
Above median % CPD 
hours 0.044 * 0.071 **** 
     
N 1942  1948  
Pseudo R2 0.0129  0.0129  
Logit regressions, marginal effects. All judgemental variables coded 1: >median for sample, 0 <= median. Full-
time only. Significance levels: 1% ****, 2% ***, 5% ** 10% *, based on robust standard errors. 
 
7. School Leaders' views on performance pay in their schools 
One of the aims of the head teacher survey was to find out how schools are adapting to the 
new pay system. The low number of responses (about 200) means that the results cannot be 
treated as representative, but they do cover a range of different schools, and so present a good 
deal of interest. They divide 56:44 between primary and secondary schools, and 41% were 
local authority maintained and 18% were academies. 
 
School leaders were asked some of the same questions as those put to classroom teachers 
about the link between pay and performance (Table 14). In many respects, they expressed 
similar misgivings to classroom teachers, although they were somewhat more positive about 
performance pay. It was also possible to compare replies for some questions with those posed 
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before implementation of the Threshold system in 2000. Although schools have run appraisals 
for nearly 15 years, and had performance progression for the Threshold and the Upper Pay 
Spine, in principle, many of the misgivings expressed in 2000 remain: in particular concerns 
about effects on teamwork and tensions with those who do not receive performance 
increments. With caution because of the small sample, leaders are a little more positive about 
the link with pay reinforcing the review process, but share of 'disagrees' and 'hard to says' also 
reveal a wide scepticism among many of them. 
 
Turning to the review process, adding the link with pay progression changes the stakes for 
both parties in the review process. When bad appraisal ratings and poorly conducted meetings 
have potential consequences for their pay, employees are more likely to challenge the result. 
To avoid this situation, management may tighten up the process, to ensure that appraisers 
prepare well for review meetings, that they have good information, and that they conduct the 
process fairly. School leaders play a pivotal role in the appraisal and objective setting process: 
in the sample, 84% either did appraisals themselves or moderated appraisals done by other 
colleagues. They are therefore the 'expert witnesses' for their schools. They were asked 
whether they had introduced any changes to their school's objective setting and appraisal 
reviews, and if so, why, and what they were. Just under half had done so, and of these, 80% 
were in preparation for the link with pay. Those who had not made changes reported that they 
thought their system was already sufficiently robust. Among the changes made, the most 
commonly cited were steps to ensure greater consistency (82%), to improve the identification 
and support for weak performance (77%), and better links with school-wide objectives (71%). 
Other common changes were greater use of both test pass rates and classroom observation, as 
well as greater involvement of senior leaders in objective setting and appraisals. Many heads 
also gave written-in examples, and their variety gives a flavour of the concrete measures 
adopted within schools.  
 
School leaders' answers on the weight given to different types of evidence used in appraisals 
highlights the primary emphasis on classroom observation (75% answered 'a great deal'), and 
on pupil test scores (50% 'a great deal'). However, there was also emphasis, albeit less, on 
other factors such as examples of lesson plans, innovations, contributions to teamwork, and 
continuous professional development.  
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Table 14 School leaders' views about linking pay to performance in schools 
(row percentages) 
 Linking pay progression to performance:  Disagree Neutral Agree N  
 Fairness and recognition      
1 It is a good principle. 2014 25.54 17.2 57.3 157 
 
 2000 52.1 12.5 35.1  
2 It means that good teaching is properly rewarded. 2014 - - -  
 
 2000 35.7 20.1 41.8  
3 It will result in a fairer allocation of pay. 2014 41.9 22.6 34.8 155 
 
 2000 40.3 28.9 28.8  
 Incentives and retention      
4 It will make everyone take the performance review more 
seriously. 2014 26.0 11.0 63.0 154 
 
 2000 25.9 17.6 55.2  
5 It will help schools motivate teachers who are 'coasting' 2014 29.7 32.3 38.1 155 
 
 2000 - - -  
6 It will give teachers greater incentive to focus on pupil 
attainments 2014 30.3 25.8 43.9 155 
 
 2000 36.2 27.3 36.6  
 Perceptions on delivery      
7 The link is problematic because it is hard to relate the work 
done in schools to individual performance. 2014 28.4 12.3 59.4 155 
 
 2000 10.6 11.6 77.3  
8 It can do little to raise performance because teachers already 
work as hard as they possible can. 2014 38.1 23.9 38.1 155 
 
 2000 30.9 19.7 58.0  
9 It will cause jealousies among teachers who get less pay 
progression than other teachers in their school. 2014 13.5 37.4 49.1 155 
 
 2000 7.9 15.7 76.7  
 Pupil performance and effective teaching      
10 It is good that individual teachers' pay should take some 
account of pupil performance. 2014 14.3 12.3 73.3 154 
 
 2000 46.3 16.7 36.7  
11 Teachers who do their jobs well make a real difference to 
their pupils' learning. 2014 0.6 0.0 99.4 176 
 
 2000 0.4 0.5 99.1  
12 There is significant variation in teaching effectiveness among 
experienced teachers in my school. 2014 41.6 4.5 53.9 178 
 
 2000 42.6 11.5 45.3  
 
The new system gives schools a greater margin of freedom as to how they link pay 
progression and appraisal. During interviews with various stakeholders, the author was told 
that schools were likely to be cautious in the first year. Given the annual cycle of performance 
review in most schools, pay for achieving objectives in the current year is arguably the 
simplest adaptation, and that would explain why half of the respondents cited this option 
(Table 15). However, given budgetary pressures, and the limited number of points on the 
former pay scale, one can understand why some schools would look at sustained performance 
over several years. 
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The CEP's earlier work on performance pay in the administrative public services revealed a 
widespread perception among employees that those who received performance payments 
were either more able or more adept at negotiating easy objectives (Marsden and French, 
1998). Either way, there was a perception that performance pay would always go to the same 
group of employees. The questionnaire therefore asked whether schools anticipated using a 
more sophisticated approach, for example, linking pay to exceeding objectives, to achieving 
more challenging objectives, particular workloads, or to making greater progress towards 
some objectives than others. In this small sample, it seems that for the moment schools are 
proceeding cautiously.  
 
Table 15 How schools propose to link pay progression to performance: (row percentages) 
  Pay progression for performance:  
 No (4) 
in the  
CURRENT 
YEAR (5)  
only 
sustained  
over 
SEVERAL  
YEARS 
(6) only 
in 
current 
year  
AND 
sustained 
N 
Pay for achieving objectives  21.3 51.6 20.0 7.1 155 
Pay for exceeding objectives only  80.9 9.6 8.8 0.7 136 
Greater pay for more challenging objectives  74.1 12.2 13.0 0.7 139 
Pay for above average progress towards their 
objectives even if some are missed  50.4 36.7 9.3 3.6 139 
Pay for exceptional workloads (e.g, piloting a 
new reform, covering for a long-term sick 
colleague)  
59.7 31.6 6.5 2.2 139 
Other  85.2 3.7 3.7 7.4 27 
Q6.1 How will your school link teachers' pay progression to performance appraisal for the current school year? 
N=155. 
 
As for the manner of the link with pay, 90% of school leaders answered that their schools 
would continue to award whole points based on the former scale, and just under 85% planned 
to award increases on the same basis on the Main and the Upper Pay Scales. In difficult 
budgetary times, one might expect schools to want to award a larger number of fractional 
points, and about one sixth of schools were planning to do this. Finally, again given budgetary 
pressures, the survey asked whether schools would like, if allowed by pay regulations, to 
award one-off, non-consolidated, increases for exceptional performance, and about half 
replied that they would. 
8. Conclusions 
The results reported here are for the first wave of a planned multi-year study of performance 
related pay progression for teachers in England and Wales, and this analysis needs to be 
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completed by linking the replies to additional data about schools from other sources. 
Therefore, any conclusions must be provisional.  
 
One of the head teacher respondents (#120) expressed the fear that the motivational effect of 
performance pay could be outweighed by the risks of demotivation on non-payment. There is 
prima facie evidence among the teachers' replies that those at the top of the old Main Scale 
and the Upper Pay Scale may be experiencing just this. An areas of potential demotivation 
can be seen in the drop in positive judgements about linking pay to performance among those 
on the old point M6 who would, a year ago, have been eligible for Threshold Assessment 
under the old rules (Figure 1). Likewise, another potential area of loss of motivation can be 
seen in the increase in perceived divisiveness among those at the top of the Upper Pay Scale.  
 
One of the big puzzles about performance management in schools in England and Wales is 
what happened to the scheme introduced in 2000. CEP research found evidence of a gradual 
but progressive improvement in objective setting and appraisal between 2000 and 2004, and 
that where this occurred, there was some evidence that school exam performance had also 
improved relative to other schools (Marsden and Belfield, 2007). Finer grain research by 
Atkinson et al (2009) found that teachers who were eligible for the Threshold improved the 
test performance of their students. Evidence shown in this paper, also suggests that teachers at 
the Threshold in 2000 had increased the share of their non-directed time towards lesson 
preparation. Yet, when the 2012 STRB reported, it could find little evidence of any effective 
link with performance. The distribution of non-directed time reported in 2014, albeit with 
caveats, appears to show no clear sign that non-directed time is being reallocated towards 
lesson preparation at any of the crucial points for teachers' career advancement, notably the 
Threshold. As in 2000, teachers' judgements about the motivating and divisive aspects of 
performance pay appear remarkably similar to those of 2000. Many of the same concerns 
remain about possible damage to team-working, potential favouritism, and even more this 
time, lack of money to fund performance increments. Both classroom and head teachers 
pointed out that increased performance in schools does not bring increased revenue to pay for 
it, which means that schools have either to make teachers who perform well wait their turn for 
pay progression, or they have to find the money from other sources, with some higher paid 
older teachers fearing this could be at their expense. As the study progresses, it may find that 
schools use the new flexibility over pay in constructive ways that avoid this dilemma. For 
example, some head teacher respondents mentioned an interest in one-off, non-consolidated 
payments. 
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The initial effect of the Threshold in 2000 also invites other interpretations. At the time, it was 
often seen as a form of performance related pay, but it was also a gateway to a higher status in 
schools, a form of promotion. Its initial intent, as stressed in a number of government papers 
at the time was to increase the scope for teachers to improve their rewards while remaining in 
the classroom rather than taking on managerial or other duties. Thus, one could interpret the 
extra time devoted to lesson preparation among those eligible for the Threshold in 2000 as 
preparing for promotion instead of responding to performance pay. One head teacher 
respondent mentioned self-determination theory as a guide to understanding motivation in 
schools (#34). The difference between promotion and performance pay is that whereas the 
former is chosen by employees, the latter is often imposed upon them. 
 
Another feature of the period in 2000 was that teachers' pay had fallen behind, and many 
schools faced serious problems of recruitment and retention. Then, teachers on Point 9 were 
earning less than average white collar pay. The Threshold pay rise would change this, and so 
many schools were faced with a dilemma: did they implement the assessment as it was 
intended by the then government; or did they get their teachers fill in the forms and to do what 
was necessary to apply for the extra money. Unfilled vacancies trump considerations about 
performance. The findings of the earlier CEP study suggest that many schools only began to 
look at performance more seriously once retention had been dealt with. 
 
The status quo on rewards for teachers is not ideal. Nearly 30% of teachers are bunched at the 
top of the Upper Pay Scale with no scope for further pay progression, with or without 
performance, and a further 15% are bunched at the top of the old Main Scale (see Appendix). 
For many of those at the top of the Upper Scale, seniority progression ceased several years 
ago, and there is the possibility that some of those at the top of the old Main Scale will remain 
there. This creates a potentially difficult situation in which a large percentage of teachers will 
not benefit from the new system, but it is also one for which schools can use it neither as an 
incentive nor as a reward. The STRB judged that the performance element in pay progression 
had been lost since 2000, but did not comment on why this had occurred. One risk with the 
current imbalance of eligibility is that it will create an environment in which it is difficult to 
establish a link between appraisal and pay progression, and this may imprint on how the new 
scheme will operate in the future. How this is resolved may depend on how schools use their 
new flexibility over pay to redesign, something this research hopes to explore in more detail 
in the future.  
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On a more positive side, this survey's results suggest that the practice of performance reviews 
and objective setting has taken root, and consolidated over time. Although the survey so far 
has highlighted some of its limitations, the results in Table 7 show that many teachers 
experience a reasonable degree of peer support and dialogue over their work objectives and 
how they relate to those of their schools. It was also notable that when schools offer support, 
such as time for CPD, teachers are likely to respond more positively about appraisal and 
performance pay progression. 
 
Objective setting and appraisal are less catchy themes than pay for performance. However, 
given the complexity of teachers' work and the level of job discretion they enjoy, it seems 
unlikely that any simple formulaic approach to performance and pay will work. This means 
that for the foreseeable future, any link to pay will depend upon the review process, how it is 
used to link teachers' individual work priorities to those of their schools, and how it can be 
used to foster a dialogue between teachers and school leaders so that objectives are well-
informed and felt to be fair. This process can take place without pay being linked to it. Indeed, 
if the STRB was correct about the link between performance and pay progression fading, the 
consolidation of appraisal over the years since 2000 suggests that the two policies can be 
considered independently. The link with pay may make people take them more seriously, but 
as with all policies, one has to consider the benefits of alternatives. In a previous project, the 
LSE researchers interviewed the Human Resource Directors of two similar NHS hospital 
trusts. One used a hospital-wide bonus, and the other, individual performance pay.9 The first 
believed strongly that linking pay to appraisal would contaminate appraisals. The second 
believed equally strongly that the link with pay was needed to make line managers take 
appraisal seriously. 
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10. Endnotes 
                                                 
1
 There had been a long period of performance for school teachers in England and Wales between 1863 and 
1890, when it was abandoned (Nelson, 1987, Jabar 2013). I am grateful to Peter Dolton for this information. 
2
 This view is challenged on the ground that school leaders will only propose colleagues for the Threshold if they 
believe they have a good chance of success. This point was put to the STRB, but there is no easy way to assess 
how far this changes the situation. 
3
 On passing the Threshold, teachers would gain a £2000 pay increase combined with the scope for further 
progression on the then new Upper Pay Scale. 
4
 The trust questions were Q9.4 in the questionnaire and comprise four questions about school leaders: Can they 
be relied upon to keep their promises (1), Are they sincere in attempting to understand classroom teachers' views 
(2), Do they understand about staff having to meet responsibilities outside work (3), and Treat staff fairly (4). 
The PRP questions were from Q7.1, and comprised: It is a good principle (1), It means that good teaching is 
properly rewarded (2), It will result in a fairer allocation of pay (3), It makes it more attractive for me to remain a 
teacher (4), The size of payments is too small to make me want to work harder to get them (5), It will cause 
resentment among teachers who feel they perform well but do not receive an award (6), It will have no effect on 
the quality of my work because it is already at the appropriate standard (7), It will give me a real incentive to 
improve/sustain the quality of my teaching (8), It will make me take the objectives of my performance review 
more seriously (9), Even if my performance is good enough, I doubt if my school can afford to reward me with a 
pay rise (10), The link is problematic because it is hard to relate the work done in schools to individual 
performance (11), Leaders will use performance pay to reward their favourites (12), It is good that individual 
teachers' pay should take some account of pupil performance (13), For all that is said about improving teaching 
quality, the new pay system is simply a device to get more work done (14). In case these results were affected by 
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PRP divisiveness questions being too closely related to those on trust, the same analysis was done using only 
those that asked positive questions about the link with pay. The results were the same to within on percentage 
point.  
5
 Up until 2000, advancement by experience points ran out at Point 9, and further advancement depended on 
taking on additional responsibilities, responsibility points, and on points awarded for other qualification or job 
demands. Up to 2000, the teachers' scale included 9 experience points, 5 for responsibility, 3 for recruitment and 
retention, and for excellence, and 2 for qualifications and for SEN (STRB 1999, Table 13). 
6
 In fact, the great majority of responsibility points were awarded to teachers who already had nine experience 
points. 
7
 By use of regression it is possible to look at the figures in Figure 2 while controlling for other factors, and in 
2000, notably school effects. These regressions confirmed that points 8 and 9 were indeed associated with higher 
percentages of time assigned to preparation, and shows that they were statistically significantly different from 
other points on the scale. 
8
 At this stage of the research it not possible to say with any certainty whether such pressure relates to individual 
teachers or their schools as a whole. 
9
 Marsden and French, (1998). 
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11. Appendix 1: Survey methods and sample characteristics  
The survey was carried out electronically, using Qualtrix, a secure method designed for ease of use 
and protection of respondent data. Contact with teachers inviting them to complete the survey was 
made by email by the teachers' professional associations to a sample of their members, and to most 
head teachers by newsletter from their associations informing them of the link. All communications 
stressed the value of the survey, and that identities of respondents and their schools would remain 
strictly confidential.  They survey went live at the end of January 2014, and closed three months 
later. It was timed to take place before teachers would know the results of their first appraisals 
under the new system. 
 
The contents of the questionnaires were discussed with the professional associations and at 
meetings with their members. They were also discussed with the National Governors' Association, 
and the Local Government Association which represents local authority employers, and with the 
Department for Education in London. At all times, it was stressed that the project is independent 
academic research, but results would be discussed with the stakeholder organisations. 
 
Where possible, respondents' gender, age, salary scale point and type of school are compared below 
with equivalent data from the School Workforce Census for 2012 (England).  
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/school-workforce-in-england-november-2012  
The survey response was higher in secondary than in primary schools, and higher among older 
teachers on higher salary scale points, and especially among those on the Upper Pay Spine. 
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Classroom teachers: demographic characteristics 
Gender % School 
work-
force 
census 
2012 (%) 
 Years a teacher % 
Female  71.1 75  Less than 1 year  2.1 
Male  28.9 25  1-2 years  3.4 
Total % 100 100  3-4 years  7.3 
N 2876   5-9 years  22.8 
Employment status    10-19 years  35.5 
 
   20 or more years  28.9 
Full-time  81.8 76  Total % 100 
Part-time  18.2 24  N 2876 
Total %  100 100    
N 2875     
Age %   Years at the 
present school 
% 
Under 25 years 2.4 6  Less than 1 year  11.0 
25-29  10.0 18  1-2 years  11.4 
30-34  12.7 17  3-4 years  15.0 
35-39  13.3 14  5-9 years  28.8 
40-44  15.7 13  10 or more years  33.8 
45-49  16.0 11  Total % 100 
50-54  15.1 10  N 2873 
55-59  11.4 9 
60 and above  3.4 2 
Total % 100 100 
N (complete replies) 2883  
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Pay spine Survey 
2014 
% 
School 
workforce 
census 
2012 (%) 
Leadership scale  4.2 - 
Upper Pay Scale  65.5 49.8 
Main Pay Scale  28.8 41.2 
Unqualified Teachers Scale  0.5 - 
Other  0.9 9.0 
Total % 100 100 
N 2865  
Salary Scale Point %  
UQT 0.53  
M1 2.47 7 
M2 2.64 6 
M3 4.02 6 
M4 3.56 5 
M5 4.09 5 
M6 12.29 15 
U1 11.55 15 
U2 11.38 11 
U3 36.03 29 
U>3 7.19  
L1-2 0.42  
L3-5 0.85  
L>5 2.99  
   
Total 100.00 100 
N 2839  
 
 
School type and status 
 Survey 2014 School workforce 
census 2012 
School type Classroom teachers School leaders Classroom teachers 
 % % % 
Primary 37.7 55.6 48.7 
Secondary 53.8 43.5 47.7 
Sixth Form College 3.0 0.8 - 
Special School 5.5 - 3.6 
    
Total 100.0 100 100 
 2332 124  
    
School status Classroom teachers School leaders Classroom teachers 
 % %  
Local Authority 
Maintained 
16.0 41.2 70.5* 
Academy 68.1 18.5 26.6 
Other 15.9 40.3 2.9 
    
Total 100.0 100 100 
 1284 119  
 
*Note many schools became academies after 2012. Note: non-response was higher for the questions 
about teachers' schools. 
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12. Appendix 2: teachers' questionnaire and summary of results 
 
Appendix: LSE Teachers survey questionnaire and summary of replies 
 
Note: Replies received by 19.5.2104, unweighted totals. 
 
 
Q2.1 How satisfied are you with the following aspects of your job? 
 
Very 
Dissatisfied 
(1) 
Dissatisfied 
(2) 
Neutral 
(3) 
Satisfied 
(4) 
Very 
Satisfied 
(5) 
Total % N 
The sense of achievement 
you get from your work 
(1) 
4.6 14.2 13.0 50.4 17.9 100 3464 
The scope for using your 
own initiative (2) 5.8 19.0 16.4 44.7 14.1 100 3458 
The amount of influence 
you have over your job (3) 12.9 30.5 21.8 29.6 5.2 100 3462 
The training you receive 
(4) 12.9 29.2 26.1 26.6 5.3 100 3463 
The opportunity to develop 
your skills in your job (5) 10.4 25.8 24.9 31.8 7.0 100 3460 
The amount of pay you 
receive (6) 10.4 29.2 26.4 30.6 3.4 100 3460 
Your job security (7) 10.9 20.4 24.1 36.3 8.3 100 3463 
Your current workload (8) 44.9 33.3 12.9 8.3 0.7 100 3463 
 
 
Q2.2 In terms of what attracts you to teaching, what are the three most important sources of satisfaction and 
dissatisfaction for you? 
 
SATIS-
FACTION 
(1) % 
clicked 
DISSATIS-
FACTION 
(2) 
% clicked 
N 
The sense of achievement you get from your work (1) 92.7 8.9 3140 
The scope for using your own initiative (2) 79.1 22.5 2325 
The amount of influence you have over your job (3) 39.2 62.4 2098 
The training you receive (4) 27.3 73.0 1458 
The opportunity to develop your skills in your job (5) 64.1 37.1 1640 
The amount of pay you receive (6) 38.3 63.2 2129 
Your job security (7) 59.7 41.5 2080 
Your current workload (8) 7.0 94.0 2667 
Other (9) (write in) 27.8 73.5 1004 
Note: % based on 1 and 0 not including -99s 
 
Written-in responses (689 replies) 
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Q3.1 I should like to ask you about the objectives set in your performance review for the current school year. 
Because arrangements differ between England and Wales, please say where your school is located: 
 England (1)  3091 
 Wales (2)    243 
 Skipped      85 
 Missing   1003 
 Total  4422 
 
Q3.2 I should like to ask you about the objectives set in your performance review for the current school year: 
 Yes (1) No (2) 
Not 
applicable 
(3) 
Total % N 
Have you already had an objective setting 
meeting for the current school year? (1) 84.3 11.4 4.3 100 3326 
 
 
 
 
 
Q3.3 Please tell me about the objectives established at your review meeting: 
 
 No (1) 
To some 
extent 
(2) 
Yes, 
defin-
itely (3) 
Total % N 
Did the meeting establish specific objectives for 
the current school year? (1) 1.1 19.2 79.7 100 2732 
Were they focused on matters over which you have 
direct control? (2) 16.1 64.1 19.8 100 2729 
Did they relate to the wider objectives in the 
school, eg., as in the School Improvement Plan or 
department or team plans? (3) 
4.5 26.5 69.0 100 2730 
Did they take account of your professional needs? 
(4) 35.5 45.3 19.2 100 2729 
Did they include indicators of pupil progress? (5) 4.6 13.3 82.2 100 2728 
Did you understand how they will be monitored 
and reviewed? (6) 9.2 38.9 51.9 100 2726 
Did you have the opportunity to discuss them with 
your head or team leader? (7) 12.4 32.7 54.9 100 2728 
Could you influence which objectives were 
chosen? (8) 27.1 50.8 22.1 100 2728 
Are you in a position to achieve them? (9) 12.3 67.2 20.5 100 2728 
Do you consider them to be fair and reasonable? 
(10) 23.1 57.3 19.6 100 2722 
Do you know how they will be related to your pay 
progression? (11) 42.2 29.8 28.0 100 2723 
 
 
Q3.4 How many objectives were recorded? 
 
1 to 3 (1) 73.7 
4 to 5 (2) 21.3 
More than 5 (3) 4.9 
Total % 100 
N 2699 
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Q3.5 Are your objectives very similar to those for 2012/13?  Please answer 'not applicable' if for example you only 
joined your current school this year. 
 Yes (1) No (2) 
Not 
applicable 
(3) 
Total % N 
Are your objectives very similar to those for 
2012/13? (1) 46.2 42.3 11.5 100 2715 
 
If No Is Selected 
Q3.6 If they are different, would you like to give an example? 
 
795 written-in replies 
 
Q4.1 Could you please tell me about the feedback you received on your past year&#39;s work at your performance 
review?  Please answer 'not applicable' if for example you only joined your current school this year. 
 Yes (1) No (2) 
Not 
applic-
able (3) 
Total % n 
Did you receive feedback from your appraiser on 
your last year's performance? (2) 61.8 23.3 14.9 100 3272 
 
If Yes Is Selected 
Q4.2 Did this feedback: 
 No (1) To some 
extent (2) 
Yes, 
definitely 
(3) 
Total % N 
Give clear reasons for the assessment? (1) 13.9 46.9 39.2 100 1990 
Help you identify areas for your further 
professional development? (2) 32.9 43.8 23.3 100 1995 
Refer to evidence that you have met the 
objectives agreed in your previous performance 
review? (3) 
10.1 36.5 53.4 100 1989 
Refer to evidence based on classroom 
observation? (4) 16.3 31.9 51.8 100 1991 
Include a recommendation on pay, if you are on 
the Upper Pay Scale? (5) 72.3 8.6 19.1 100 1896 
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Q4.3 Please tell me how supportive you found your recent appraisal and objective setting meetings 
 
Disagree 
strongly 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Hard to 
say (3) 
Agree 
(4) 
Agree 
strongly 
(5) 
Total % N 
They enable me to discuss 
how my own work priorities 
fit with those of my school (1) 
12.3 23.5 23.4 35.2 5.6 100 1953 
They make school leaders 
better informed about the 
demands of my job (2) 
25.2 35.9 20.5 15.8 3.6 100 1952 
I was able to discuss what I 
want to achieve in my job 
with school leaders (3) 
17.8 27.1 16.5 32.2 6.5 100 1951 
I could have a frank and open 
discussion about how to 
improve/ sustain my 
performance (4) 
15.8 25.1 18.4 32.7 8.1 100 1950 
The discussions make more 
confident to try out new ideas 
in my teaching (5) 
23.1 34.8 23.3 15.4 3.5 100 1952 
 
Q4.4 Has the process of appraisal and objective setting at this school directly led to, or involved, changes in any of 
the following aspects of your teaching? 
 
No 
change 
(1) 
A small 
change 
(2) 
A 
moderat
e change 
(3) 
A large 
change 
(4) 
Not 
applicab
le (5) 
Total % N 
Your classroom 
management practices (1) 46.4 22.3 18.9 8.4 4.0 100 3134 
Your knowledge and 
understanding of your main 
area or subject field (2) 
65.6 14.5 11.2 4.8 3.9 100 3131 
Your knowledge and 
understanding of 
instructional practices in 
your area (3) 
58.3 18.6 13.7 4.4 5.0 100 3124 
Your development or 
training plan to improve 
your teaching (4) 
49.7 24.2 15.7 6.1 4.2 100 3136 
Your teaching of students 
with special learning needs 
(5) 
65.3 16.1 8.9 4.4 5.2 100 3135 
Your handling of student 
discipline and behaviour 
problems (6) 
73.3 11.9 6.9 3.3 4.6 100 3136 
Your teaching students in a 
multicultural setting (7) 76.7 5.7 3.3 1.2 13.1 100 3132 
The emphasis you place on 
improving student test 
scores in your teaching (8) 
29.2 15.2 19.7 30.9 5.0 100 3134 
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Q4.5 In the last three years, have you tried any new ideas that have helped you teach better? (excluding national 
initiatives) 
 Yes (1) No (2) Total % N 
Have you tried any new ideas? (1) 93.0 7.0 100 3120 
 
If this was the result of your own or a group initiative, would you like to give an example? 
906 written-in answers 
 
Q4.6 Were these new ideas something that you undertook: 
 
Yourself, 
at your 
own 
initiative? 
(1) 
As a group 
initiative 
with a 
small 
number of 
your 
colleagues
? (3) 
As the 
result of a 
manageme
nt proposal 
or 
decision? 
(2) 
As the 
result of 
discussion 
at a 
perform-
ance 
review? (4) 
Other (5) Total % N 
Please 
select the 
most 
appropriate 
description 
(1) 
47.7 23.4 21.1 3.4 4.4 100 2879 
 
 
Q5.1 I should like to ask your views about performance among teachers in your school 
 
Disagree 
strongly 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Hard to 
say (3) 
Agree 
(4) 
Agree 
strongly 
(5) 
Total 
% N 
Teachers who do their jobs well make a 
real difference to their pupils' learning (1) 0.4 1.0 7.1 35.1 56.4 100 3092 
There is significant variation in teaching 
effectiveness among experienced teachers 
in my school. (2) 
3.1 15.1 27.0 35.7 19.1 100 3084 
 
If you answered 'agree' or 'agree strongly' to question Q5.1, please answer Q5.2: 
 
Q5.2 In your school, what do you believe are the two most common causes? 
 
Differences in 
levels of 
teaching skills 
(1) 
Differences in 
motivation or 
morale (2) 
Differences 
in age (3) 
Ability to 
motivate 
their pupils 
(4) 
Some teachers 
have a very 
difficult 
workload / 
group of 
students (5) 
Other 
(6) 
Total 
% N 
Most 
common 
cause (1) 
24.4 28.7 2.1 9.9 32.8 2.2 100 2853 
Second 
most 
common 
cause (2) 
18.8 28.9 5.1 16.6 25.3 5.4 100 2644 
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Q6.1 In your most recent full week of teaching, approximately how many hours did you spend working outside 
directed hours such as in the evenings, before the school day and at weekends? 
Non-directed hours    Mean Standard 
deviation 
N 
Full-time 19.5 9.7 2341 
Part-time 14.2 7.3 504 
All 18.5 9.6 2845 
 
Q6.2 If this was NOT a typical week, did you work: 
 
More hours than 
usual (1) 
Less hours than 
usual (2) Total % N 
Did you work:? (1) 37.2% 62.8% 100 999 
 Hours Hours    
Average hours: FT 21.0 17.4   
Average hours PT 14.5 13.2   
 
 
Q6.3 Considering the two most recent school weeks (excluding holidays and INSET days), roughly how many hours 
per week have you spent on each of the following activities outside directed hours such as in the evenings. before the 
school day and at weekends? 
 Please answer  to the nearest whole hour (1) 
Lesson preparation and marking (including report 
writing, pupil records, etc) (1) 54.8% 
Seeing parents and pupils outside class time (e.g for 
additional help with work, guidance) (2) 7.7% 
Involvement in school clubs, sports, orchestras etc. (3) 5.1% 
School/staff management meetings, management 
activities etc (including appraising staff) (4) 11.1% 
General administrative tasks (e.g organising resources, 
general record-keeping, photocopying) (5) 16.2% 
Individual & professional development activities (e.g 
professional reading, courses, conferences, and being 
trained or being appraised) (6) 
5.1% 
Total % 100 
Hours (non-directed time) 18.4 
N 2989 
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Q6.4 What was the most important reason for undertaking these activities outside directed hours? The drop-down 
menus list some common reasons why teachers work such hours. Please select the one that best describes your 
position:  
(Activities appear in the columns, and the reasons for undertaking them, in the rows: column percentages) 
  
Lesson 
preparation 
etc. (1) 
Seeing 
parents 
and 
pupils 
outside 
class 
time (2) 
Involvement 
in school 
clubs etc (3) 
School/staff 
management 
meetings etc 
(4) 
General 
administrative 
tasks (5) 
Individual 
professional 
development 
activities (6) 
- I wanted to get 
the work done 
(1) 
21.9 4.2 1.0 4.1 46.9 7.1 
- I felt under 
pressure from 
management (2) 
9.1 8.4 13.9 31.8 11.8 8.1 
- To meet the 
objectives of my 
performance 
review (3) 
1.6 2.4 3.5 5.6 1.6 16.8 
- It is the only 
way to give high 
quality education 
to my pupils (4) 
50.1 20.3 6.5 2.1 18.1 12.9 
- I had taken on 
extra 
responsibilities 
because I need 
the money (5) 
0.3 0.7 1.0 2.2 0.6 1.2 
- I enjoy the 
work (6) 0.8 2.3 18.3 0.1 0.3 13.5 
- I do it for the 
benefit of my 
school (7) 
1.1 12.8 18.8 14.2 3.7 7.0 
- I don't want to 
let down my 
colleagues or my 
pupils (8) 
10.5 17.5 5.6 5.0 7.2 3.1 
- The activities 
are available 
only outside 
formal school 
hours (9) 
3.1 22.6 21.5 24.7 6.3 14.1 
Other (10) 1.5 8.7 9.9 10.3 3.5 16.2 
N 2939 2359 1726 2533 2772 1913 
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Q7.1 I should like to ask your views about linking pay progression to the performance review: 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
(3) 
Agree (4) Strongly Agree (5) 
Total 
% N 
It is a good principle (1) 34.4 25.3 16.8 21.2 2.3 100 2949 
It means that good teaching is properly 
rewarded (2) 31.8 32.6 14.0 18.9 2.7 100 2949 
It will result in a fairer allocation of 
pay (3) 41.6 37.7 12.4 7.0 1.3 100 2941 
It makes it more attractive for me to 
remain a teacher (4) 53.0 29.9 12.1 3.7 1.3 100 2943 
The size of payments is too small to 
make me want to work harder to get 
them (5) 
5.2 9.4 43.2 26.5 15.7 100 2942 
It will cause resentment among 
teachers who feel they perform well 
but do not receive an award (6) 
3.7 2.0 4.5 37.8 52.0 100 2948 
It will have no effect on the quality of 
my work because it is already at the 
appropriate standard (7) 
2.8 4.3 18.8 38.3 35.8 100 2950 
It will give me a real incentive to 
improve/sustain the quality of my 
teaching (8) 
42.7 31.1 18.4 6.5 1.2 100 2947 
It will make me take the objectives of 
my performance review more seriously 
(9) 
29.8 27.3 20.7 18.0 4.2 100 2945 
Even if my performance is good 
enough, I doubt if my school can afford 
to reward me with a pay rise (10) 
2.6 5.6 18.9 32.3 40.5 100 2950 
The link is problematic because it is 
hard to relate the work done in schools 
to individual performance (11) 
1.9 2.7 8.4 32.1 54.9 100 2945 
Leaders will use performance pay to 
reward their favourites (12) 2.7 7.7 20.0 31.8 37.9 100 2938 
It is good that individual teachers' pay 
should take some account of pupil 
performance (13) 
27.5 28.3 21.6 20.5 2.1 100 2942 
For all that is said about improving 
teaching quality, the new pay system is 
simply a device to get more work done 
(14) 
2.6 4.9 22.0 32.5 38.0 100 2945 
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Q8.1 To what extent do you agree with the following statements about working in your school? 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(3) 
Agree (4) Strongly Agree (5) 
Total 
% N 
I share many of the values of 
my school (1) 2.8 8.5 14.1 54.4 20.2 100 2938 
I feel loyal to my school (2) 4.2 8.8 15.3 45.8 25.9 100 2937 
I am proud to tell people 
which school I work for (3) 4.1 8.2 21.6 39.3 26.8 100 2937 
 
 
Q8.2 How often do you engage in the following activities in your school? 
 Never (1) Some-times (2) 
Quite 
often (3) 
Very 
often (4) 
Total 
% N 
Attend team conferences for the age/subject 
group I teach (1) 25.3 35.6 23.2 15.9 100 2922 
Teach jointly as a team in the same class (2) 58.2 30.7 6.8 4.4 100 2926 
Engage in joint activities across difference 
classes and/or year groups (e.g projects) (3) 31.7 48.5 13.6 6.2 100 2930 
Using my own initiative, I carry out tasks 
that are not required as part of my job (4) 3.5 28.0 33.0 35.5 100 2929 
 
 
Q9.1 Does your school use any of the following methods to try to produce better academic performance? 
 No (1) 
Occas-
ionally 
(2) 
Regul-
arly (3) 
Not sure 
(4) 
Total 
% N 
Learning about educational practices used at 
comparable schools scoring strongly in school 
'league t8ables' (England) or school banding 
(Wales) (1) 
22.5 35.9 24.9 16.8 100 2893 
Discussing ways to improve your school's 
academic performance at group or dept. 
meetings within your school (2) 
5.4 20.8 71.2 2.6 100 2898 
Learning about educational practices used at 
other comparable schools (3) 11.9 48.2 33.2 6.7 100 2901 
 
 
Q9.2 When important educational targets are, or look likely to be, missed in your school, in your view, which of the 
following best characterize the response of leaders in your school? 
 
Leaders 
consider the 
problem, and 
propose a 
course of 
action to the 
school (1) 
Consult and 
then propose 
a solution (2) 
Sit down with 
the relevant 
year or 
subject 
groups to 
work our a 
solution 
together (3) 
Seek to 
identify the 
individual 
teachers who 
might be 
responsible 
(4) 
Ignore the 
problem and 
hope it will 
go away (5) 
Total 
% N 
Most common 
response (3) 55.8 9.5 12.1 18.4 4.2 100 2865 
Second most 
common response 
(4) 
19.1 27.8 20.8 23.9 8.5 100 2686 
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Q9.3 Overall, how good would you say managers at this school are at: 
 
Very 
Bad (1) Bad (2) 
Neither 
Good 
nor Bad 
(3) 
Good 
(4) 
Very 
Good 
(5) 
Total 
% N 
Seeking the views of classroom teachers or 
teacher representatives (1) 21.1 27.4 23.6 23.4 4.6 100 2885 
Responding to suggestions from classroom 
teachers or teacher representatives (2) 17.4 29.6 26.7 22.8 3.5 100 2884 
Allowing classroom teachers or their 
representatives to influence final decisions (3) 21.8 32.5 26.8 16.7 2.1 100 2880 
Work together with teachers to develop the 
priorities in the School Improvement Plan (4) 18.8 29.3 28.5 19.3 4.1 100 2877 
 
 
Q9.4 The leadership group in my school: 
 
Never 
(1) 
Rarely 
(2) 
Some-
times (3) 
Most of 
the Time 
(4) 
Always 
(5) 
Total 
% N 
Can be relied upon to keep their 
promises (1) 6.4 18.8 39.6 30.1 5.1 100 2879 
Are sincere in attempting to 
understand classroom teachers' 
views (2) 
11.7 25.6 32.3 22.2 8.2 100 2884 
Understand about staff having to 
meet responsibilities outside work 
(3) 
13.5 24.2 30.0 23.5 8.8 100 2880 
Treat staff fairly (4) 6.7 14.8 34.5 35.8 8.2 100 2869 
 
 
Q10.1 Have you acted as the APPRAISER for one or more of your colleagues at their Performance Review? 
Yes (1)  33.3 
No (2) 66.7 
Total % 100 
N 2888 
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Q10.2  On the basis of your experience as an APPRAISER, would you say that the performance review meetings 
have helped your school in any of the following ways? 
 
Not at 
all (1) No (2) 
Hard to 
say (3) Yes (4) 
Yes, 
defin-
itely (5) 
Total 
% N 
Relate teachers' objectives to the wider 
objectives of the school, e.g as in the 
School Improvement Plan, or that of their 
department or team? (1) 
3.4 8.8 18.6 55.6 13.6 100 944 
Link individual teachers' professional 
development with school objectives? (2) 3.0 10.7 16.3 59.1 10.9 100 944 
Provide an opportunity to discuss issues 
related to poor performance? (3) 3.7 19.7 20.0 49.6 7.0 100 941 
Encourage teachers to think more 
systematically about their own work 
priorities? (4) 
4.0 22.2 22.6 45.3 5.9 100 943 
Identify and deal with problems of teacher 
morale or motivation? (5) 20.9 34.4 20.6 21.0 3.2 100 943 
Identify and resolve difficult workload 
issues? (6) 25.8 39.7 16.4 16.3 1.8 100 940 
Help teachers who have difficulty 
motivating their students? (7) 14.8 33.3 27.1 22.7 2.1 100 942 
In terms of staff time, the meetings 
represent good value for money for my 
school (8) 
16.5 27.8 34.0 18.7 3.0 100 943 
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